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1. Introduction 
Japan's financial  system  is in the midst  of a major transformation.  One 
driving  force is deregulation.  The reform program  that has  come  to be 
known  as the Japanese  Big Bang represents  the conclusion  of a deregula- 
tion process  that began more than 20 years ago. By the time the Big Bang 
is complete,  in 2001, banks, security firms, and insurance companies  will 
face a level  playing  field on which  unfettered  competition  can occur. At 
that time, Japanese financial markets will be at least as liberalized as the 
U.S.  markets. 
A second  (and we will argue related) driving factor is the current huge 
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financial  crisis.  As  of September  1998,  the  estimates  of bad  loans  in Japan 
remain  at 7% of GDP  (see  Section  4 below  for further  details).  This  crisis 
has  included  the  first  significant  bank  failures  since  the  end  of  the  U.S. 
occupation  of  Japan.  In policy  circles,  the  banking  problems  are  widely 
identified  as  one  of  the  key  factors  for  the  poor  performance  of  the 
Japanese  economy  over  the  last  couple  of  years.1  A  growing  academic 
literature  suggests  that  the  problems  in  the  banking  sector  are  now 
creating  a serious  drag  on  the  economy's  ability  to  recover.2 
The  Japanese  government  during  the  1990s  has  taken  a  number  of 
steps  to  address  the  financial  problems.  Starting  with  the  loan  purchas- 
ing  program  set  up  in early  1993,  followed  by  the  establishment  of banks 
to  buy  out  failed  credit  cooperatives  and  the  jusen,  and  culminating  in 
the  reforms  that  reorganized  the  supervision  authority  for  banks  and 
earmarked  over  ?60  trillion  for  bank  reorganization  and  capitalization, 
there  have  been  a nearly  continuous  set  of  attempts  to  fix  the  banking 
problem.3 
In the  latest  attempt,  the  Long-Term  Credit  Bank  of Japan  (LTCB) and 
Nippon  Credit  Bank  (NCB)  were  nationalized  in  late  1998,  and  three 
regional  banks  were  put  under  receivership  in the  first half  of 1999.  Their 
balance  sheets  are  supposed  to  be  cleaned  up  so  that  they  can  be  sold. 
Meanwhile,  in  March  1999,  15 large  banks  applied  for  a capital  injection 
and  received  ?7.4592  trillion  of  public  funds.  These  banks  are  also  re- 
quired  to  carry  out  restructuring  plans  that  will  include  eliminating 
20,000  workers,  closing  10% of their  branches,  and  increasing  profits  by 
50%  over  the  next  four  years.4  Nevertheless  critics,  including  the  U.S. 
1. For example,  both the International  Monetary Fund (IMF) (1998a) and the Organization 
for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD) (1998) country  reports  on Japan 
for 1998 point  to the  banking  problems  as a key  factor in causing  the  post-November 
1997 slowdown  in growth.  The Japanese government's  1998 Economic White Paper also 
identifies  problems  in the  financial  sector an important  factor in prolonging  the  reces- 
sion  (Economic Planning  Agency,  1998). 
2. For instance,  Bayoumi  (1998) finds that fluctuations  in asset prices played  an important 
role  in  recent  Japanese  business  cycles  and  that  the  shocks  were  mostly  transmitted 
through bank lending.  Without associated  changes  in bank loans, asset price fluctuations 
would  not have affected the real economy  very much,  he argues.  Likewise,  Ogawa  and 
Kitasaka (1998) report that small firms were especially hard hit by the decline in bank loans 
in the 1990s and that small- and large-firm investment  differentials  have emerged  as the 
slow growth has continued.  Motonishi  and Yoshikawa (1998) find that the index of (firms' 
perception  of) banks' willingness  to lend (loose or tight) in BOJ's Tankan  survey worsened 
substantially  from late 1997 and contributed  to slow  growth,  especially  at small  firms. 
Finally, Woo (1998) argues  that since  1997 there  has been  a marked  shift  in bank-loan 
supply  that has contributed  to the weak  growth  in 1997 and 1998. 
3. For a discussion  of the loan purchasing  program by the Cooperative  Credit Corporation 
see  Packer (1998). For a review  of the jusen problems  see  Milhaupt  and  Miller (1997). 
4. For more  details  on the  restructuring  plans,  see  Choy  (1999). Individual  restructuring 
plans  in Japanese  can be  downloaded  from the  Financial Reconstruction  Commission 
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Treasury, have  argued  that  these  steps  have  been  inadequate.5  In the 
latter half of 1999, two  more  regional  banks  were  shut  down  and ?260 
billion  of public  funds  were  injected  to re-capitalize  four other regional 
banks.  As  of  this  writing  there  is  still  widespread  pessimism  about 
whether  the banks have  turned the corner. 
We believe  that a recurring problem  with  the Japanese government's 
attempts  to overcome  the crisis has been the lack of a clear vision  for the 
future  of  the  Japanese  banking  system.  For instance,  the  debate  that 
culminated  in the passage  of the Financial Reconstruction  Bill in the fall 
of  1998  was  drawn  out  because  the  ruling  Liberal  Democratic  Party 
(LDP) and the major opposition  party (the Democrats) haggled  over two 
competing  plans.  On  the  surface,  the  negotiation  seemed  to center  on 
what  should  happen  to  the  Long-Term Credit  Bank,  which  had  been 
rumored  to be  insolvent  for almost  4 months.  At a deeper  level,  how- 
ever, the two plans represented  competing  views  about the current con- 
dition  of the Japanese banking  system. 
LDP leaders believed  that the major banks could not be allowed  to fail. 
To them,  the biggest  problem with the Japanese banks was they were not 
strong  enough  to  support  (supposedly)  healthy  customers.  Thus,  the 
desired  solution  was  to inject public funds  into the major banks as they 
did in March 1998, to prevent  a credit crunch.  In the event  of a failure, 
protecting  solvent  borrowers,  by transferring the failed bank's business 
to a bridge bank, was  given  the highest  priority. 
The Democrats  argued  instead  that giving  public  funds  to the  weak 
banks was  a waste  of taxpayers' money. Weak banks should  be national- 
ized  and restructured.  Through  this process,  the Japanese banking  sec- 
tor would  reemerge  smaller but healthier. 
In the  end  the  LDP and  the  Democrats  reached  a compromise  and 
passed  the  Financial  Reconstruction  Act.  This  law  allows  the  newly 
created Financial Reconstruction  Commission  to choose  between  nation- 
alization  and  a  bridge  bank  scheme  when  a  bank  fails.  However, 
shortly  thereafter,  over  the  objections  of the  Democrats,  the  LDP also 
formed  a  coalition  with  the  Liberal  Party  and  managed  to  pass  the 
Prompt  Recapitalization  Act  to  help  recapitalize  supposedly  healthy 
banks.6 
Thus,  the  struggle  in the  Diet  during  the  fall of  1998 amounted  to a 
battle over whether  the Japanese banking  sector has too little capital or 
5. For instance,  Lawrence Summers,  while  he was  U.S.  Deputy  Secretary of the Treasury, 
was reported to have suggested  to Hakuo Yanagisawa, chairman of the Financial Recon- 
struction  Committee,  that another  round  of capital injections  may be necessary  (Nikkei 
Net Interactive,  February 26, 1999.) 
6. See Fukao (1999) for a summary  and an analysis of the two laws,  and Corbett (1999a) for 
a more complete  history of the policies  leading  up to the fall 1998 legislation. 132 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
whether  Japan is currently overbanked.  To settle this issue  one needs  to 
ask what  the banking  sector will look like once the current crisis is over 
and the deregulation  is complete.  This question  has attracted little atten- 
tion.  For instance,  although  there is now  some  discussion  of how  many 
large banks  might  be viable,  aside  from Moody's  (1999) and Japan Eco- 
nomic  Research Center (1997) (which we  discuss  in detail below)  we  are 
unaware  of any  attempts  to determine  how  many  assets will  remain  in 
the banking  sector.7 
More importantly,  the  mergers  and  closures  that have  occurred  thus 
far (including  the  fall 1999 megamergers)  have  not  reduced  capacity  in 
the industry.  If the overbanking  hypothesis  is correct, these adjustments 
alone  will probably not help.  Similarly, the March 1999 capital injection 
required the 15 banks that received  funds  to reduce their general admin- 
istrative expenses  by ?300 billion,  but at the same time to increase loans 
to prevent  a so-called  "credit crunch." We believe  that one needs  a clear 
vision  of the future of the industry  to evaluate  this situation. 
One  of the primary contributions  of this paper is an attempt  to make 
some  educated  guesses  about  the  future  size  of the  industry.  We hope 
that by  providing  these  estimates  we  can inform  the  debate  over  how 
much  assistance  it is  reasonable  to provide  now.  We believe  that it is 
impossible  to determine  the appropriate level of resources to earmark for 
rescuing  the  existing  banks  without  taking  a position  on what  role the 
banks will play in the post-Big  Bang economy. 
To answer  this question  about the future, it is necessary  to review  the 
recent  history  of  the  financial  system.  In particular, we  need  to know 
how  the  Japanese  banking  system  got  into  so  much  trouble.  Having 
determined  the  cause  of the current trouble we  can then  ask what  will 
have  to occur in order for the banks to get out of trouble.  Based on our 
diagnosis,  we can then assess  what the financial system,  particularly the 
banking  system,  will look like once the crisis is over. 
The story that emerges  from our investigation  points  to the nature of 
the  deregulation  leading  up  to the  Big Bank as playing  a major role in 
the banking  crisis. During  the Japanese high-growth  era, usually  dated 
from  the  mid-1950s  through  the  mid-1970s,  the  financial  system  was 
regulated  to steer both savers and borrowers  towards banks.  As growth 
slowed  in the mid-1970s  a gradual  deregulation  process  started.  By the 
late  1980s  this  deregulation  had  eliminated  many  of  the  restrictions 
regarding  large  corporations'  options  for financing.  During  the  1980s 
these  key  bank  clients  began  sharply  reducing  their  dependence  on 
7. For example,  Atkinson  (1998) argues that there will be only  two  to four major banks in 
Japan. We believe  it is more  important  to focus  on  the  size  of the  sector  than  on  the 
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bank  financing.  By the  1990s large  Japanese  firms'  financing  patterns 
had begun  to look very similar to those  of the large U.S.  firms. 
Meanwhile,  innovation  and  the  deregulation  of  the  restriction  on 
households'  investment  moved  much  more  slowly.  Most Japanese sav- 
ings  into  the late 1990s continued  to flow  into banks.  The banks  there- 
fore  remained  large  but  had  to  search  for new  lending  opportunities. 
[The same  type  of argument  is emphasized  by Gorton and Rosen (1995) 
in their discussion  of the U.S. banking  crisis.] The new  lines of business 
that they entered  turned out badly. 
We conclude  that  the  lopsided  nature  of  the  financial  deregulation, 
combined  with maturing of the Japanese economy  and slow growth start- 
ing in the mid-1970s,  created a disequilibrium  situation that has lasted to 
date. To eliminate the disequilibrium,  further deregulation  of the financial 
system will be inevitable.  Once the deregulation  is complete,  the Japanese 
allocation  of  savings  and  the  investment  financing  patterns  will  move 
further towards  the patterns seen in the United States. We show  this will 
imply  a substantial  decline  in the prominence  of the banks. 
To paint this picture we divide  the discussion  into five parts. First, we 
review  the  regulatory  conditions  that prevailed  prior to the  Big Bang, 
focusing  on  the banking  regulation  that has  governed  the  system  over 
the  last  two  decades.  We  argue  that  the  regulation  in  Japan and  the 
United  States is converging  and that the United  States provides  a sensi- 
ble benchmark  to use  in forecasting  what  might  happen  in Japan. Sec- 
tion  3 provides  some  empirical  support  for this  proposition.  We show 
how  past  deregulation  in Japan has  altered  firms' borrowing  patterns 
and banks'  activities.  In Section  4 we  describe  the  current  state  of the 
banking industry. This brief section aims to clarify some common misper- 
ceptions  about  the  current  crisis  and  explain  why  there  are so  many 
different estimates  of its scope.  In Section 5, we look ahead and ask how 
much  lending  will  be  required  if Japanese  firms'  borrowing  patterns 
move  closer to those  seen  in the United States.  Our calculations  suggest 
that this will imply a sizable contraction in the traditional banking sector. 
Finally,  in  the  conclusion  we  briefly  discuss  several  scenarios  for the 
transition between  the current system  and the eventual  system. 
2.  Financial  Regulation  in Japan 
To understand  the  current  conditions  and  to  put  the  current  rules  in 
context  it is necessary  to review  briefly some  background  information. 
Until the  1920s, the Japanese banking  system  was  characterized by free 
competition  with little regulation.  The Bank Act of 1890, for instance,  set 
no  minimum  capital  level  for banks.  A  series  of banking  crises  in  the 134 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
1920s, especially  the banking panic of 1927, led the Japanese government 
to  change  completely  its  attitude  toward  regulating  banks,  and  tight 
regulation  of the banking sector began.  Government  regulation  and con- 
trol of the financial system  intensified  under  the wartime  economy. 
This pattern  continued  during  the U.S.  occupation  of Japan. Indeed, 
some  reform measures  implemented  during  the occupation,  such as the 
Glass-Steagall-style  strict  separation  of  commercial  and  investment 
banking,  helped  perpetuate  the government's  strong role in the financial 
sector. The financial system  was  also highly  segmented.  The regulatory 
framework  that  was  completed  during  the  occupation  period  stayed 
more or less in place until the mid-1970s.8 
During the high-growth  era from 1955 through  1973, banks dominated 
the financial system.  Bond markets were repressed,  and equity issuance 
was  relatively uncommon.9  In the 1970s this all began  to change. 
One big change was slower aggregate growth. Up until this time house- 
hold  savings  were  mostly  channeled  through  banks to finance business 
investment.  With lower  growth the corporate funding  requirements  fell. 
The success  of the Japanese economy  in the rapid-economic-growth  pe- 
riod also helped  the corporations accumulate internal funds.  This intensi- 
fied the decline  in the borrowing  requirements  of the companies. 
A third feature of the economy  in the 1970s was  that the government 
began  to run a sizable  deficits.  The deficits  arose because  of a combina- 
tion of slower  tax revenue  growth,  a policy  decision  to engage  in deficit 
spending  to  try to  spur  the  economy,  and  an  expansion  of  the  Social 
Security  system.  To finance  the  deficits,  the  government  significantly 
ramped up its bond  issuance. 
2.1 CHANGES  AFFECTING  SAVERS 
The increase  in the government  bond  issues  changed  the financial  sys- 
tem.  Previously,  the limited  amounts  of debt that were issued  were  sold 
almost  exclusively  to financial institutions.  The coupon  rates were  low, 
but the banks  and other buyers  tolerated  this because  the total amount 
issued  was  small and other government  regulation  was protecting  them 
from competition.  Moreover,  it was  customary  for the Bank of Japan to 
periodically buy up the government  bonds  from the financial institutions 
as a way to keep money-supply  growth in line with aggregate growth.  But 
the soaring debt issuance  would  have impaired the banks' profitability if 
they  had been  forced to absorb all the low-yielding  government  bonds. 
Thus,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  was  compelled  to  open  a secondary 
8. See Patrick (1967, 1971, 1972) and Hoshi  and Kashyap  (1999a) for further details. 
9. For instance,  Patrick (1972) examined  financial intermediation  in this period  and found 
that the "capital issue  markets played  a relatively minor role" (p. 112). The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  *  135 
market for government  bonds  in 1977, and to start issuing  some  bonds 
through  public  auctions  in 1978. The opening  of the  secondary  market 
for government  bonds,  combined  with  accumulation  of financial wealth 
by households  during  the rapid economic  growth  of the  1960s and the 
early  1970s,  increased  the  demand  for bonds.  Moreover,  many  of  the 
restrictions  in  the  bond  markets  that  had  been  put  in  place  to  ration 
funds  during the high-growth  era now  started to look out of date. 
The expansion  of the secondary  market for government  bonds  under- 
mined  the interest-rate controls that had been a prominent  feature of the 
postwar  financial system.  Since the government  bonds  were now  traded 
at market prices,  investors  were  able to stay away  from the other finan- 
cial assets,  such  as deposits,  whose  interest  rates were  set at artificially 
low  levels.  Thus,  opening  up  the  government  bond  market  led  to the 
liberalization of interest rates in many other markets. For example,  inter- 
est  rates  in  the  interbank  lending  market,  the  tegata market,  and  the 
gensaki market were  all freed from any regulation  by the late 1970s.10  All 
the other interest rates except  deposit  rates were  fully liberalized by the 
end  of the 1980s. Starting with  large deposit  accounts,  the deposit  rates 
were  gradually  decontrolled  during  the  1980s and the  1990s, and were 
completely  unrestricted by April 1993. 
In addition  to the interest-rate  deregulation,  there were  several  other 
steps  that  gave  savers  better  options.  Money-market  mutual  funds 
slowly  began  to appear, and investing  in other new  instruments  such as 
commercial paper eventually  became possible.  However,  there was a lag 
between  the time when  bond  financing  and commercial-paper  issuance 
became  commonplace  and when  savers  could  easily  hold  these  securi- 
ties.  A summary  of the major changes  is contained  in Table 1. The key 
conclusion  from  this  table  is that options  for savers  gradually changed 
and many restrictions survived  into the late 1990s. As we will see,  these 
changes  lagged  the  changes  that  benefited  borrowers  and  in  several 
respects  were not nearly as dramatic. 
2.2  CHANGES AFFECTING BORROWERS 
Probably the biggest  development  for borrowers  was  the emergence  of 
vibrant bond markets both at home  and abroad. In the domestic  market, 
until the mid-1970s  firms seeking  to issue bonds  had to secure approval 
from a body  known  as the Bond Issuance  Committee.  This group deter- 
mined  not  only  who  would  be  allowed  to  issue  bonds  but  also  how 
much each issuer could raise. Firms seeking  to issue bonds  had to satisfy 
10. In a gensaki  transaction,  a seller sells a security  to a buyer with an agreement  to repur- 
chase the same security  at a certain  price  on a certain  future  date. The  gensaki  market  is 
open to all corporations.  In a tegata  transaction,  a seller  sells a bill  before  its maturity  to a 
buyer at a discount. The tegata  market  is restricted  to financial  institutions. 136 *  HOSHI & KASHYAP 
Table 1  SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AFFECTING THE CHOICES AVAILABLE 
TO JAPANESE SAVERS 
1979  Negotiable  CD market set up. 
1981  Maturity-designated  time deposits  introduced  (up to 3 yr); new  type of 
loan trust fund  (called "big") accounts  introduced  by trust banks. 
1982  Money-market  dealers allowed  to begin buying  bills; securities  compa- 
nies banned  from selling  foreign-currency  zero-coupon  Euro bonds  to 
residents  (ban lifted subject to certain restrictions  in February 1983) 
1983  Banks start over-the-counter  sale of government  bonds  to the general 
public; government-bond  time deposit  account introduced;  medium- 
term government-bond  time deposit  account introduced;  postal  insur- 
ance system  permitted  to invest  in foreign bonds; banks authorized  to 
sell long-term  government  bonds  and medium-term  government  bonds 
over the counter. 
1984  Short-term Euro-yen  loans to residents  liberalized; domestic  trade in 
CDs and CPs issued  abroad permitted. 
1985  Initial relaxation of time-deposit  rates (for deposits  over 1 billion yen) 
and money-market  certificate (MMC) rates (interest-rate ceiling  of 0.75% 
below  weekly  average newly  issued  CD rate); bankers' acceptance  mar- 
ket created. 
1986  Treasury bill auction begins. 
1987  Freely determined  interest rates permitted  for time deposit  accounts 
over ?100  million. 
1988  Postal savings  system  allowed  to progressively  increase foreign invest- 
ments  and to diversify  domestic  investments  (no longer  obligated  to 
place all its funds  with the Trust Fund Bureau). 
1989  Introduction  of small-lot MMCs (minimum  lot ?3  million); unregulated 
interest rates for time deposits  over ?10  million. 
1990  Interest-rate ceilings  for money-market  certificates removed;  residents 
allowed  to hold  deposits  of up to ?30 million with banks overseas  with- 
out prior authorization. 
1991  Unregulated  interest rates for time deposits  over ?3  million; pension 
funds  and investment  trusts allowed  to buy securitized  corporate loans. 
1992  Securities houses  allowed  to offer money-market  funds  (minimum  de- 
posit  of ?1  million provided  that more than half of such funds  are in- 
vested  in securities). 
1993  All time-deposit  rate ceilings  removed. 
1994  All major interest-rate restriction have been  removed. 
1997  Security houses  allowed  to handle  consumer  payments  for their clients; 
restriction on minimum  sales unit of commodity  funds  removed. 
1998  OTC sales of investment  trusts by banks and insurance  companies. 
1999  Liberalization  of brokerage commissions  for stock trading. 
Sources: Takeda and Turner (1992); Ministry  of Finance,  Banking Bureau Annual Report, various  issues; 
Ministry of Finance,  Securities Bureau  Annual Report, various  issues. The  Japanese  Banking Crisis * 137 
a set  of financial  conditions  relating  to size,  profitability,  and  dividend 
payments.  In addition,  bonds  had to be issued  with  collateral. 
The  first  step  towards  liberalization  came  in  1975 when  the  Bond 
Issuance Committee  adopted  a policy of honoring  the requested  amount 
of bond  issues  by every  company.  The collateral requirements  also be- 
came  gradually  less  important.  In 1979, unsecured  straight bonds  and 
unsecured  convertible  bonds  were permitted,  but the bond issue  criteria 
were so stringent  that only two companies  (Toyota Auto and Matsushita 
Electric) were  qualified  to issue.  The criteria for unsecured  bonds  were 
gradually  relaxed during the 1980s. 
Several of the key developments  played  out in international  markets. 
This first became possible  because  of the reform of the Foreign Exchange 
and  Trade Control  Act  in  1980.  Foreign  exchange  transactions,  which 
were  "forbidden  in principle"  under  the  old rule, were  made  "free un- 
less  expressly  prohibited."  The  internationalization  was  further  ad- 
vanced  in  1984 by  the  abolition  of the  "real demand  principle,"  which 
required  foreign  exchange  transactions  to be backed by  "real" demand 
for foreign exchange,  such as foreign trade. Following  the suggestions  in 
the  Yen-Dollar  Commission  report,  the  euro  market was  substantially 
deregulated  and the Tokyo offshore market was  opened  in 1986. 
The foreign  bond  markets were  attractive for Japanese firms because 
they made it possible  to bypass  the Bond Issuance Committee.ll  Perhaps 
most importantly, no collateral was required in foreign markets. This led 
to high levels  of issuance  in foreign markets. Warrant bonds,  which were 
introduced  in  1981 and  allowed  the  holders  to have  an option  to buy 
shares  at a prespecified  price  during  a certain period,  were  a leading 
example.  Throughout  the  1980s many  warrant bonds  were  issued  out- 
side Japan, even  though  these  securities  did not prove to be very popu- 
lar in the domestic  market. 
Liberalization  also  proceeded  in  the  domestic  market.  By  1987 the 
domestic  commercial-paper  market  was  created,  giving  firms  another 
nonbank  source  of funding.  By the late 1980s firms began  to be able to 
avoid  the  bond  issuance  criteria if they  were  rated.  Finally in  1996 all 
rules regarding bond  issues  were lifted. 
11. However,  some  self-regulation  by the  security  houses  continued,  so that firms in the 
1980s were still forced to satisfy versions  of the bond issuance  criteria in order to be able 
to issue  debt  abroad.  Although  Japanese banks  technically  could  underwrite  foreign 
bond issues  by Japanese corporations  through the banks' foreign subsidiaries,  the three- 
bureaus  agreement  of 1975 suggested  that banks  should  "pay due  respect  to the experi- 
ence  gained  by and the mandate  given  to the Japanese securities  firms" (Rosenbluth, 
1989, p.152).  In practice, the three-bureaus  agreement  has been interpreted  to prohibit 
subsidiaries  of Japanese banks from becoming  the lead underwriters  of bond issues  by 
Japanese corporations.  Thus the Japanese banks did not have much say about the self- 
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Over  this  period  regulations  regarding  stock  markets  were  also 
changed.  Listing requirements  were eased,  and commissions  were even- 
tually deregulated.  These changes  made equity issuance  more attractive, 
although  initial  public  offerings  were  typically  more  underpriced  in 
Japan than elsewhere  (see Jenkinson,  1990). 
The  key  changes  regarding  the  opening  up  of  capital  markets  are 
collected  in Table 2. Comparing  this table and  the previous  one  shows 
that the  financing  options  for bank borrowers  opened  up  much  faster 
than the  options  for savers.  As we  document  below,  by the end  of the 
1980s  many  of  the  banks'  traditional  clients  had  already  migrated  to 
cheaper  bond  financing.  One  striking statistic is that during  the decade 
the number  of firms permitted  to issue  unsecured  domestic  bonds  grew 
from tw  o  to over 500. 
The third leg of deregulation  dealt with  changes  in bank powers.  The 
major changes  are shown  in Table 3. We draw three important  lessons 
from the list. First, bank powers  were expanded  very slowly  and gradu- 
ally. While  the banks'  main borrowers  were  able to get quickly into the 
bond  market,  the  banks  had  their  hands  tied  in  many  respects.  For 
instance,  securitizing  loans  was  not  even  possible  until  1990.  Second, 
many new  types  of businesses,  particularly fee-generating  activities,  did 
not become  available until relatively recently. For example,  through  1998 
Japanese banks were still prohibited  from collecting  fees by offering loan 
commitments.  Thus,  banks in Japan were  essentially  forced to continue 
to  try to  make  money  through  conventional  deposit-taking  and  loan- 
making  during  the 1980s. [Gorton and Rosen  (1995) point out that simi- 
lar problems  were  present  in the  U.S.  Furthermore,  the  absence  of an 
active takeover market for banks likely exacerbated the problems  in both 
countries.]  Finally, even  up until the end  of 1990s there were  significant 
barriers which  continued  to keep  investment  banking  and  commercial 
banking  separated  in Japan. 
The culmination  of the deregulation  is the Big Bang.12  When  the gov- 
ernment first proposed  the program in the fall of 1996, it was heralded  as 
drive to make Japanese financial markets  "free, fair and global." As we 
describe more completely  below,  the result will be that banks,  insurance 
companies,  and securities  dealers will be able to compete  directly. 
2.3 COMPARISONS  WITH  THE  UNITED  STATES 
As we  look  ahead  we  see  these  changes  pushing  the Japanese financial 
system  to become  more similar to the U.S.  system.  In fact, ever since the 
U.S.  occupation  of Japan there  has  been  a certain  degree  of  similarity 
12. There are many  good  summaries  of the provisions  of the Big Bang. Two recent guides 
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Table 2  SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE LIBERALIZATION  OF 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
1975  Bond issuance  committee  begins  to honor requested  amounts  for firms 
that pass the criteria. 
1976  Official recognition  of gensaki (repurchase  agreement)  transactions. 
1977  First issue  of 5-year government  bonds; first issue  of Euro-yen  bonds 
by a nonresident;  secondary  trading of government  bonds  permitted. 
1978  First issue  of medium-term  coupon  government  bond  (the first to be 
issued  by auction; 3-year bonds  on this occasion,  followed  by 2-year 
bonds  in June 1979 and 4-year bonds  in June 1980). 
1979  Unsecured  straight bonds  and unsecured  convertible  bonds  permitted. 
1980  Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Act amended  so "free unless  pro- 
hibited" replaces  "forbidden in principle." 
1981  Warrant bonds  introduced. 
1982  Criteria for the issuance  of unsecured  bonds  by Japanese residents  in 
overseas  market clarified. 
1983  Eligibility standards  for issuing  unsecured  convertible  bonds  relaxed. 
1984  "Real demand  rule" for foreign  exchange  lifted; swap  agreements  and 
hedging  of forward foreign-exchange  transactions allowed;  collateral re- 
quirement  for nonresident  issue  of Euro-yen  bonds  dropped;  freer issu- 
ance of yen-dominated  CDs in Japan; standards  for issuing  samurai 
bondsa  by private companies  eased. 
1985  First unsecured  straight corporate bond issued; bond  futures intro- 
duced; first shogun bondb  issue; first Euro-yen  straight bond issued. 
1986  The credit rating system  in the qualification  standard fully introduced 
for Euro-yen  bonds  issued  by nonresidents;  floating-rate  notes  and cur- 
rency conversion  bonds  introduced  for Euro-yen  issued  by residents; 
first issue  of short-term government  bonds  (TB); public issue  of 20-year 
government  bonds; Japan offshore  market opened  (minimum  deposit 
?100  million; minimum  time 2 days). 
1987  Introduction of credit rating system  in the qualification standards  for 
Euro-yen  bond  issues  by residents; packaged  stock futures market es- 
tablished  on the Osaka Stock Exchange,  ending  a ban introduced  in 
1945; commercial-paper  market created. 
1988  Restrictions on samurai CP issues  by nonresidents  relaxed. 
1989  Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange established;  rating crite- 
ria for bond  issuance  added. 
1990  Accounting  criteria for bond  issuance  removed. 
1992  Bond issuance  restrictions eased: more companies  allowed  to issue 
bonds  overseas,  and restraints on samurai bonds  relaxed. 
1995  Deregulation  on OTC (JASDAQ) market, creating a new  market to facili- 
tate fundraising  for startups. 
1996  All bond  issuance  restrictions have been  removed. 
1998  Introduction  of medium-term  notes; relaxation of rules governing  asset- 
backed securities. 
Sources:  See Table 1. 
a Yen-dominated  public bonds  which  are issued  in Japan by non-Japanese  residents. 
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Table 3  SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING TO THE RANGE OF 
PERMISSIBLE  ACTIVITIES  FOR BANKS 
1979  Banks permitted  to issue  and deal in CDs; banks permitted  to introduce 
short-term impact loans (foreign-currency  loans to residents)  subject to 
certain conditions. 
1980  Foreign exchange  banks allowed  to make medium  and long-term  impact 
loans. 
1982  Japanese banks permitted  to lend yen  overseas  on a long-term  basis to 
borrowers  of their choice  (earlier priority system  for overseas  yen  lend- 
ing is abolished). 
1983  Banks started over-the-counter  sale of government  bonds  to the general 
public; banks authorized  to affiliate with  mortgage  securities 
companies. 
1984  Securities licenses  granted  to subsidiaries/affiliates  of some  foreign 
banks with branches  in Japan (equity stakes limited to 50%); permission 
for foreign  and Japanese banks to issue  Euro-yen  CDs with maturities 
of 6 months  or less; banks allowed  to deal on their own  account in 
public bonds. 
1985  Foreign banks allowed  to enter trust banking business;  banks began 
trading in bond  futures; medium  and long-term  Euro-yen  loans to non- 
residents  liberalized. 
1986  City banks authorized  to issue  long-term  mortgage  bonds; banks' over- 
seas subsidiaries  authorized  to underwrite  and deal in CP issues 
abroad. 
1987  Banks allowed  to engage  in private placement  of bond  issues;  banks 
begin  underwriting  and trading in the domestic  CP market; banks al- 
lowed  to deal in foreign financial futures. 
1988  Banks allowed  to securitize  home  loans. 
1989  Banks begin brokering government-bond  futures; banks allowed  to 
securitize  loans to local governments. 
1990  Banks allowed  to securitize  loans to corporations; banks allowed  to en- 
ter the pension  trust business  through  their investment  advisory 
companies. 
1992  Financial System  Reform Bill passes  the Diet, allowing  banks to set up 
subsidiaries  to enter the securities  business  (effective April 1993). 
1993  Three bureaus  agreement  ends,  allowing  banks to be lead underwriters 
in foreign bond  issues; IBJ, LTCB, Norin  Chukin Bank, Sumitomo 
Trust, and Mitsubishi  Trust establish  their subsidiary  security firms. 
1994  Major city banks establish  their subsidiary  security firms. 
1998  Ban on financial holding  companies  lifted. 
1999  Banks, trust banks,  and securities  houses  can enter each other's mar- 
kets; banks  allowed  to issue  straight bonds. 
2001  Banks and securities  houses  will be allowed  to enter the insurance 
business. 
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between  the financial systems  in the two countries.  A key reason for the 
similarity  is  that  Article  65  of  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Act  was 
passed  in March of 1947 with the intent of mimicking  the U.S.  Bank Act 
of 1933 (Glass-Steagall).  Both laws mandated  a separation of investment 
and commercial banking.  This separation  has constituted  a defining  fea- 
ture that differentiates  the  two  financial  systems  from those  in Europe 
and  has  shaped  the  evolution  of  both  systems.  In  what  follows,  we 
argue that not only has the evolution  been  similar, but the banks in the 
two  countries  are going  to become  even  more similar in the future. 
The Japanese banks  have  traditionally been  more successful  than the 
U.S.  banks  in their attempts  to participate  in investment  banking.  For 
instance,  the banks  were  able to play  the role of trustee  of collateral in 
the  bond  underwriting  process  in Japan, while  they  were  mostly  shut 
out  in  the  United  States.  Similarly, Japanese  banks  were  able  to  take 
limited  equity  positions  in the firms to which  they were  lending.  How- 
ever,  as Dale (1992) points  out,  like the U.S.  banks,  the Japanese banks 
were  "excluded  from  market-making  in  and  the  public  distribution  of 
corporate  securities."  This constraint  kept  the Japanese banks  from be- 
coming  full-fledged,  German-style  universal banks.  Instead the Japanese 
financial  system,  like  the  U.S.  system,  was  fragmented,  with  banks, 
insurance  firms,  and  securities  firms  each  maturing  while  facing  little 
direct competition  from each other. 
Within  the  banking  system  in  each  country  there  was  further  seg- 
mentation.  In the  United  States,  cross-border  branching  was  restricted 
until  recently  so  that banks  could  not  compete  on  a nationwide  basis. 
Similarly,  in  Japan,  competition  between  city  banks,  trust  banks,  re- 
gional  banks,  long-term  credit  banks,  and  other  small  banks  such  as 
credit  unions  has  traditionally  been  restricted  by  legal  measures  and 
administrative  guidance  by the Ministry of Finance. 
Beyond  the  segmentation,  there  are further  similarities  in  the  ways 
that the bank powers  in the  two  countries  changed  over  time.  In both 
countries,  the drive by the commercial banks to reenter investment  bank- 
ing  has  taken  more  than 50 years.  During  this period  the  deregulation 
process  has been  slow  and incremental.  In the United  States,  for exam- 
ple,  banks  were  allowed  to enter  investment  banking  through  subsid- 
iaries only  in  1987, as regulators  began  to reinterpret Section  20 of the 
banking  laws that prohibits banks from having  affiliates that are "princi- 
pally  engaged"  in nonbanking  activity. Over  time  the permissible  frac- 
tion of bank income accruing from the so-called  "Section 20 subsidiaries" 
has slowly  risen. 
In Japan,  the  financial  system  reform  in  1993 made  it  possible  for 
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tual establishment  of bank-owned  securities subsidiaries  was only gradu- 
ally  permitted  over  the  next  couple  of  years.  The  range  of  securities 
services  that these  subsidiaries  can provide  is still limited,  but the limita- 
tions will be incrementally  removed  between  now  and 2001. 
Importantly,  as banking  deregulation  proceeded  in Japan, there  was 
discussion  over  whether  a  shift  toward  permitting  universal  banking 
would  be desirable.  In March 1989 the Ministry of Finance convened  an 
advisory  group  dubbed  the Second  Financial System  Committee  of the 
Financial System  Research  Council.  This group  described  five  possible 
routes  towards  permitting  more  integration  of commercial  and  invest- 
ment  banking:  separated  subsidiaries,  multi-functional  subsidiaries, 
holding  companies,  universal banks,  and a piecemeal  approach  (Second 
Financial System  Committee,  1989). According  to the Committee,  "the 
sight of banks pushing  out in every  direction  in pursuit  of high returns, 
even  at high  risk, might  shake people's  faith in them."  Thus,  the Com- 
mittee  recommended  against  a universal  banking  approach.  Ultimately, 
in 1993, the separated-subsidiary  approach was adopted.  Later, in 1997, 
relaxation  of  Section  9 of  the  Anti-Monopoly  Act  made  it possible  to 
establish  a financial holding  company. 
As the turn of the century  approaches,  firms trying to offer one-stop 
financial shopping  are facing fewer and fewer barriers in both countries. 
In Japan, as  a result  of  the  Big Bang,  it is already  possible  to create  a 
holding  company  that can span the securities  and insurance  industries. 
By April 2001 it will be possible  to bring banking  into the same holding 
company.  In the  United  States  legislation  to repeal  Glass-Steagall  was 
finally passed,  allowing  the banking,  securities  underwriting,  and insur- 
ance businesses  to be integrated.  Thus, in the near future the regulatory 
conditions  in the two countries  will be very similar. 
Once  the deregulation  in both countries  is complete,  a transition  fea- 
turing competition  among entrenched  securities  firms, insurance compa- 
nies,  and banks will begin.  In the previous  version  of this paper,  Hoshi 
and Kashyap (1999b), we tabulated all the major alliances in the Japanese 
financial services  industry  that were  announced  in 1998 and early 1999. 
This very  long  list of tie-ups  suggests  that a scramble is already under- 
way  to provide  much  broader  services  than have  been  available in the 
past,  and that the same sort of tie-ups  are occurring in the United States 
and  in  Japan.  Finally, the  list  also  shows  that  foreign  institutions  are 
aggressively  entering  the Japanese market. 
Collectively  these  patterns  suggest  that  banks  in  the  two  countries 
are going  to face the same types  of competitive  pressures  and will have 
some  sort of options  available to respond  to the pressures.  Although  the 
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banks,  it is hard to see  why  the bank activities  in the two  countries will 
not become  similar. 
3. An Empirical  Look  at the Fallout  from the Deregulation 
To support  our contention  that Big Bang is going  to push  the  financial 
system  in Japan to look more like the U.S.  system,  we  examine  several 
pieces  of evidence.  For organizational  purposes  it is convenient  to sepa- 
rate  the  discussion  into  the  responses  of  the  borrowers,  savers,  and 
lenders.  We will see that the behavior of large and small borrowers turns 
out to be quite different.  On the bank side  we  will distinguish  between 
the portfolio adjustments  that were made and the new business  opportu- 
nities  that were missed.  For the savers we will see that the deregulation 
prior to the Big Bang has not made a big difference. 
Throughout  most of our discussion  we will emphasize  the importance 
of regulatory shifts.  This choice does not mean that we doubt the impor- 
tance  of  other  factors  such  as macroeconomic  conditions.  In fact,  it is 
quite reasonable  to assume  that the deregulation  may have  contributed 
to the  fast growth  of lending  in the  late  1980s that preceded  the  long 
recession  of the  1990s. However,  for the purposes  of looking  ahead  we 
do  not  believe  that  it  is  necessary  to  separately  identify  the  role  of 
macroeconomic  factors. Our basic point is that the past deregulation  did 
have  some  independent  effects  and that based  on the responses  to past 
deregulation  it is reasonable  to expect that the Big Bang will have a large 
effect as well.  Thus,  our empirical work is aimed at showing  that regula- 
tory shifts have clear, independent  influences  on borrowers,  savers,  and 
banks.13 
3.1 THE  RESPONSE  OF BORROWERS  TO 
FINANCIAL-MARKET  DEREGULATION 
It is widely  recognized  that part of the  reason  why  banks  in Japan got 
into trouble is that they lost many of their best borrowers  in a very short 
period  of time.14 As mentioned  earlier, between  1983 and 1989 the Japa- 
13. There are several  studies  that focus on drawing  a more comprehensive  picture of what 
caused  the  current banking  problem  in Japan. Cargill,  Hutchison,  and  Ito (1997) list 
both  macroeconomic  conditions  generated  by loose  monetary  policy  in the  late 1980s 
and reduced  corporate dependence  on bank financing,  on which  we  focus,  as contrib- 
uting  factors to the problem.  They also list other factors such  as government  deposit 
guarantees  and  regulatory  forebearance.  Cargill  (1999) gives  a similarly  comprehen- 
sive list. By estimating  some cross-section  regressions,  Ueda (1999) confirms the impor- 
tance of both macroeconomic  conditions  and financial deregulation  in bringing  about 
the banking  problem. 
14. For instance,  see Cargill, Hutchison,  and Ito (1997), Cargill (1999), Ueda (1999), Lincoln 
(1998), Hutchison  (1998), and Hoshi  and Kashyap  (1999a). 144 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
nese  bond  market blossomed,  permitting  many  internationally  known 
companies  to tap the  public  debt markets  for the  first time.  While  this 
story  is well  known,  we  are unaware  of  any  attempts  to  compare  the 
bank dependence  of large Japanese and U.S.  firms before  and after the 
deregulation.  We provide  evidence  that the Japanese deregulation  has 
permitted the largest Japanese firms to become  almost as independent  of 
banks as their U.S.  counterparts. 
A major challenge  in conducting  this investigation  is the limited avail- 
ability  of  comprehensive  data  on  bank  borrowing  by  firms.  In Japan 
there  are essentially  two  types  of data that can be used.  For exchange- 
traded  firms,  the  corporate  financial  statements  that are publicly  avail- 
able  generally  break  out  bank  borrowing.  This  means  that  for  these 
(typically)  large firms one  can get fairly good  data. As  an example,  the 
Japan Development  Bank Database provides  this type of information  on 
over 2000 firms for 1997. 
To learn anything  about unlisted  companies  one  must  rely on survey 
data. The most  comprehensive  survey  that we  know  of on this topic  is 
conducted  by the Ministry  of Finance and published  in the Hojin Kigyo 
Kiho (Quarterly Report of  Incorporated Enterprise Statistics).  The  cross- 
sectional  coverage  of  these  data is excellent.  All  nonfinancial  corpora- 
tions with book capital  of ?1 billion ($8.33 million using the exchange  rate 
of 120 ?/$)  are included  in the survey.15 The remaining  (small corpora- 
tions) are randomly  sampled  with  sampling  factors that depend  on their 
size.  Only very tiny firms (those with less than ?10 million in capital) are 
completely  excluded.  We believe  that the survey  is sufficiently  compre- 
hensive  that  it essentially  sidesteps  the  selection  problems  associated 
with  using  listed data.16 
The main drawback with  the survey  information  is that data for firms 
with  similar  amounts  of  capital  are aggregated,  so  that  no  firm-level 
statistics  are accessible.  Unfortunately,  all the size thresholds  used  in the 
MOF data  are based  on  nominal thresholds,  so  that  over  time  (as the 
price level  rises)  firms drift into  the  upper  grouping,  even  if their size 
measured  in constant  prices is unchanging.  We discuss  the effect of this 
limitation  in the places where  we believe  it might be important. 
In our analysis  we  focus on the ratio of (the book value  of) bank debt 
to (the book value  of) total assets  as the basic measure of the importance 
of bank financing.  We scale by assets to eliminate  pure size differences.17 
15. In what  follows  we  use  this exchange  rate. We use  GDP deflators when  it is necessary 
to convert nominal  amounts  into real amounts. 
16. For example,  the 1997 fourth-quarter survey was sent to 23,475 firms, and the response 
rate was  over 80% (19,007). 
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Below  we  also  show  some  results  which  distinguish  among  different 
industries.  The industry  comparisons  can be motivated  in many  ways, 
including  as an attempt  to correct for industry-level  differences  in risk 
and collateralizability of assets. 
Table 4 shows  the  ratio of the bank debt to total assets  based  on  the 
MOF data for different-sized  Japanese firms over time.  The data pertain 
to the second  quarter of each year between  1980 and 1998. In addition  to 
showing  data for all industries,  the table also displays  separate series for 
manufacturing,  wholesale  and retail trade, and all other firms. The larg- 
est firms which  are separately  identified  in the sample  are those  with  a 
book  value  of  equity  greater  than  ?1  billion  in  current  prices.  In the 
second  quarter of 1998 the 5363 firms in this category had average assets 
of ?112  billion.18 
The table reveals  a consistent  pattern  of large Japanese firms scaling 
back their bank borrowing.  The shift has been most pronounced  among 
manufacturing  firms, where  the ratio of bank debt to assets has dropped 
by almost  50%. Moreover,  the  shift was  effectively  complete  by  1990- 
since then the ratio has been roughly constant.  This timing suggests  that 
the banks lost many of their traditional clients soon  after the opening  up 
of the bond  market. 
There was  also  a substantial  drop  in bank  dependence  for the  trade 
firms. In publicly available versions of the survey all trade firms are shown 
together, but the Ministry of Finance provided  us with unpublished  data 
for selected  years which  allow us to separate wholesale  trade companies 
from the retail trade companies.  From the unpublished  data we  learned 
that the  drop  in bank  dependence  is more  pronounced  for retail trade 
firms than for wholesale  trade firms. For instance, between  1980 and 1998 
the  large retail trade companies  cut their bank-debt-to-asset  ratio from 
0.35  to  0.26,  while  the  wholesale  firms  cut  theirs  from  0.35  to  0.30. 
the total-debt-to-total-asset  ratio. This decomposition  distinguishes  the total amount of 
leverage  from the sources  of financing  for borrowers.  For our purposes  we believe  this 
distinction  is not very helpful,  since  the banks presumably  care about their total lend- 
ing. To a first approximation  it probably does not matter if they are losing  business  over 
the kind of long periods  that we are studying because  of overall deleveraging  as opposed  to 
more competition  from other funding  sources.  We also checked  that using  book-value 
data  would  not  paint  a misleading  picture.  A  quick comparison  of data  on  national 
income  accounts  in Japan and  the  United  States  suggested  that the  gap between  the 
current value  of assets  (the analog to market value) and the historical value was similar 
in the two  countries.  Thus,  we  see  no  obvious  biases  from using  book-value  data for 
both countries. 
18. Of the 5363 large firms,  2192 were  in manufacturing,  941 were  in trade (wholesale  or 
retail),  and  the  remaining  2230 were  in other  industries.  There were  1,161,179  small 
firms in the 1998 survey, with  232,313 in manufacturing,  363,707 in trade, and 565,159 
in the other industries. Table 4  HOJIN KIGYO  TOKEI  DATA ON  THE RATIO OF BANK DEBT TO ASSETS FOR JAPANESE FIRMS 
(Large firms have book value  of equity  greater than 1 billion  yen.) 
All Industries  Manufacturing  Wholesale  and Retail  Other 
Year  Large  Firms  Small Firms  Large  Firms  Small Firms  Large  Firms  Small Firms  Large  Firms  Small Firms 
1978  0.3786 


























































































































































































Source:  Ministry of Finance,  Hojin Kigyo Tokei. The survey  includes  all the corporations  with book capital of ?1 billion  ($8.3 million using  the exchange  rate of 
120 ?/$) in all nonfinancial  industries.  The rest (small corporations)  are randomly  sampled  with sampling  factors depending  on their sizes.  The average value 
of assets  for the large firms is ?112  billion  ($934 million)  in 1998. There were  5,363 large firms and 1,161,179  small firms in the 1998 survey.  The firms in the 
"other" category are all those  which  are not in manufacturing,  wholesale  trade, or retail trade. The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  * 147 
Table 4 also  indicates  that remaining  large  firms hardly  changed  their 
bank borrowing. 
To explore the effect of the nominal  thresholds  we also looked  at other 
data for listed  firms.  In Table 5 we  report analogous  statistics  in which 
we  define  large firms to have real assets  (measured  in 1990 prices) to be 
greater than  ?120  billion  ($1 billion).  Using  this  consistent  size  defini- 
tion,  the  manufacturing  firms  show  an  even  more  pronounced  shift 
away  from  bank  debt.  The  larger  drop  is  partly  expected,  since  the 
nominal  size thresholds  in the MOF survey  data will cause some  smaller 
firms  (which  are presumably  more  bank-dependent)  to  drift  into  the 
large firm category over time. 
The third and fourth columns  in Table 5 show  the patterns  for large, 
listed  wholesale  and  retail firms.  The retail firms show  the  same  gen- 
eral  pattern  as  the  manufacturing  firms,  although  the  drop  in  bank 
dependence  is less pronounced.  For the listed wholesale  trade firms the 
bank-debt-to-asset  ratio drifted up noticeably  in the 1980s, before begin- 
ning  to decline  in the  1990s. This nonmonotonic  decline  can be  traced 
to the behavior  of the nine  large general trading firms and is not repre- 
sentative  of other wholesaling  companies.  The trend  disappears  when 
these  nine  firms  are  omitted,  and  the  aforementioned  unpublished 
MOF data showed  a slight  overall drop in bank dependence.19  The final 
column  in  the  table  shows  that  the  remaining  large  listed  firms have 
also cut their bank borrowing. 
The two  tables  together  show  a clear pattern of rapid adjustment  by 
the  large  firms  (except  for possibly  a few  wholesale  trade companies). 
Notice  in Table 5 that for all the  sectors  where  bank  dependence  was 
falling,  the  bank-debt-to-asset  ratios  in  1990 and  1998 were  about  the 
same,  so  that in fact much  of the  adjustment  had  occurred before  the 
onset  of slow  aggregate  growth. 
In contrast, among  the small firms there has been no clear reduction in 
bank dependence.  Indeed,  Table 4 shows  that in each of the major sec- 
tors the smaller firms have become  somewhat  more bank-dependent  as 
the deregulation  has progressed,  although  in manufacturing  and in the 
"other" sector  small  firms'  bank  dependence  is  below  the  peaks  that 
occurred  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s.  As  we  discuss  below,  we 
19. The nine companies  in question  are Mitsui Bussan,  Itochu, Kanematsu,  Sumitomo  and 
Company,  Tomen,  Nissho  Iwai,  Nichimen,  Marubeni,  and Mitsubishi  and Company. 
When  they  are excluded,  the ratio of bank debt to assets  is much  lower  in most years 
(e.g.  0.248 in 1998 as opposed  to 0.431), and in 1998 it is slightly lower than in the early 
1970s. We have heard several anecdotes  suggesting  that this discrepancy  arises because 
the large trading companies  took on considerable  bank debt in the 1980s in order to set 
up subsidiaries  to enter the real estate business. 148 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
Table  5  RATIO  OF BANK  DEBT  TO ASSETS  FOR  PUBLICLY  TRADED 
JAPANESE  FIRMS 
(Large  firms are defined to have book value of assets > ?120 billion 
at 1990  prices.) 
Nonmanufacturing 
Excluding  Wholesale 













































































































































Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  the Japan Development  Bank Database  of companies  listed  on  the 
major Japanese stock exchanges. 
believe  that some  of these  patterns  are attributable to the  fact that the 
banks  themselves  did not  shrink much  as the  deregulation  proceeded. 
One  question  raised  by  these  patterns  is  what  they  imply  for  the 
future  of  relationship  financing  in  Japan.  The  data  in  Tables 4  and  5 
clearly show  that even  before  the  Big Bang had  taken  place,  the  large The  Japanese  Banking Crisis ? 149 
Japanese  firms  had  cut  their  bank  dependence.  Tight  dependence  of 
large firms on their banks was  probably  the most  unusual  aspect  of the 
Japanese  financial  system.20  A  growing  literature  (e.g.,  Petersen  and 
Rajan, 1994; Berger and  Udell,  1995) shows  that relationship  financing 
for small  firms is quite prevalent  also  outside  of Japan. It appears  that 
any relationship  financing  that will  continue  in Japan will be more like 
what is observed  elsewhere  in the world. 
To put the size of the shift in behavior of the large firms in perspective, 
we offer a comparison  with  financing patterns in the United States. This 
effort is complicated  because  of the  absence  of completely  comparable 
data for the  United  States.  Contrary to the  conventions  followed  in Ja- 
pan,  there are no  standard  sources  that provide  firm-level  information 
on firms' bank borrowing.  U.S.  firms do sometimes  identify  bank lend- 
ing in the footnotes  to their financial  statements,  but databases  such  as 
Compustat  do  not  report  such  information.  So we  cannot  report  data 
which  would  be comparable to Table 5. 
The  only  broad-based  U.S.  data  on  bank  borrowing  patterns  come 
from  a  survey  conducted  by  the  Census  Bureau  called  the  Quarterly 
Financial  Report  for  Manufacturing,  Mining,  and  Trade Corporations 
(QFR).21  The QFR contains the financial statistics for corporations aggre- 
gated by industry  and by size.  Like the MOF survey, the size thresholds 
are based  on  nominal  thresholds,  although  the  QFR size  cutoffs  are 
based on assets rather than capital. The coverage of the QFR for manufac- 
turing industries  is outstanding.  All the corporations  with  total assets  of 
$250 million  and over are included  in the survey.  Smaller firms are ran- 
domly  sampled  with  sampling  factors ranging  from ? to 1-,  depending 
on their sizes. 
Unfortunately  the QFR coverage  beyond  manufacturing  is quite lim- 
ited.  For firms in three  industries  (mining,  wholesale  trade,  and  retail 
trade)  all the  corporations  with  total  assets  $250 million  and  over  are 
included,  but  small  corporations  are intentionally  excluded.  Since  1988 
the definition  of "small" has been  set so that no corporations  with  total 
assets  under  $50  million  are included;  previously,  between  1981 and 
1987, this threshold  has been $25 million in current prices. This prevents 
us from examining  the financing pattern of small firms outside  manufac- 
turing. Moreover,  for industries  that are not covered  by the QFR (trans- 
20. See  Aoki  and  Patrick (1994) for a comprehensive  study  of  the  tight  dependence  of 
Japanese firms on banks. There is no contradiction  in saying  that the past relationships 
for the large firms may have been  valuable  but were  not sustained  after deregulation. 
This will be the case if, as capital markets improved,  the costs of being tied to the banks 
was  rising. See Hoshi  and Kashyap  (1999a) for further discussion  on this point. 
21. See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) for more discussion  of the QFR. 150 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
portation,  communication,  services,  construction,  etc.),  we  cannot  get 
data even  for large firms. 
It is fairly straightforward to find a breakpoint in the QFR data that can 
be  compared  with  the Hojin Kigyo Tokei  Kiho data described  in Table 4. 
Recall from Table 4 that the average  asset size of the large Japanese firms 
was  $934 million  in 1998. According  to QFR for 1998, the average size of 
total  assets  for manufacturing  corporations  with  assets  $10 million  or 
above  was  $1020 million.  Thus,  it appears  that "large" firms in Table 4 
are roughly  comparable  to QFR data for firms with  total  assets  of $10 
million. 
Table 6  shows  data  on  the  bank-debt-to-asset  reported  in  the  QFR 
from 1979 through  1997. Columns  2 through 4 show  data on all manufac- 
turing  firms and  then  on  large  and  small  manufacturing  firms respec- 
tively. We draw three conclusions  from this part of table. First, and most 
importantly,  the  time-series  variation  in bank  dependence  in  the  U.S. 
data is much  less  noticeable  than in the Japanese data.  Second,  for the 
large firms there has been a slight upward  drift in the bank-debt-to-asset 
ratio. Consequently  the bank dependence  of the U.S. and Japanese large 
firms  is  much  closer  now  than  in  the  1980s-we  explore  this  further 
below.  Third, the small manufacturing  firms in the two countries  do not 
seem to be converging  in their borrowing behavior. The small U.S. manu- 
facturing  firms  have  held  steady  with  a ratio  of  bank  debt  to  assets 
between  16% and  19%. In contrast,  the  small Japanese firms' ratio has 
crept  up  from  about  29% to  35%.22 
The remainder of Table 6 provides  information  on borrowing  patterns 
by wholesale  and  retail trade firms.  Interpreting  these  figures  requires 
some care, since the universe  of firms included  in the sample has changed 
greatly across the years-see  the footnotes  to the table for details. Despite 
these  changes,  it seems  safe  to  conclude  that very  large  nonmanufac- 
turing firms in the United States are still much less bank-dependent  than 
similar firms in Japan. 
One potential  concern with  Table 6 is that the nominal  size thresholds 
may be responsible  for some  of drift upwards  in the large manufactur- 
ing  firms' bank  dependence.  Unfortunately,  we  were  unable  to obtain 
any  unpublished  data  from  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau  to  check  this  di- 
rectly. However,  based  on  the  checks  which  we  were  able  to perform 
using  published  data,  this  does  not  seem  likely  to be  too  much  of  an 
issue.  For instance,  it  is  possible  to  study  manufacturing  firms  with 
more than $1 billion in assets.  Within this sample,  the firms which  drift 
22. Toward the  end  of  the  1990s,  however,  the  bank  dependence  of the  small  Japanese 
manufacturing  firms did decline.  We expect this pattern to continue  after the Big Bang. Table 6  QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORTS DATA ON  THE RATIO OF BANK DEBT TO ASSETS FOR U.S.  FIRMS 
(Large manufacturing  firms are defined  as having  nominal  assets  >  $10 million.) 
Year  All  Large  Small  All 






































































































































Source:  Quarterly  Financial Report for Manufacturing,  Mining,  and  Trade Corporations  (QFR) produced  by Bureau of Census.  For manufacturing  firms  all 
corporations  with total assets  of $250 million  and over are included  in this survey.  Smaller manufacturing  firms are randomly  sampled  with  sampling  factors 
ranging  from  1/2 to 1/160,  depending  on  their sizes.  We  define  large  firms to be  those  with  nominal  assets  greater  than  $10 million.  The sampling  rules 
governing  the inclusion  of wholesale  and retail trade firms has changed  over time.  In the 1979 and 1980 surveys,  the rules for these  sectors  were the same  as 
that for manufacturing.  From 1981 to 1987, only firms with assets  above $25 million were included.  From 1988 on, firms had to have assets  above $50 million  to 
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into the category  should  already be quite large and have  a low  level  of 
bank dependence.  This sample  of firms shows  the same basic patterns as 
in Table 6: bank dependence  rises in the late 1980s and then  falls in the 
1990s, but remains  at a higher  level than in 1980. 
Comparing  Tables 4 and  6, we  find that the bank dependence  of the 
large Japanese firms has become  closer to that of comparable-sized  U.S. 
firms, particularly in manufacturing  industries.  The convergence,  how- 
ever,  still looks  incomplete.  One  possible  reason  for this may be cross- 
country  differences  in  the  industrial  structure.  Average  bank-debt-to- 
asset ratios vary considerably  across industries.  For instance,  in the 1998 
MOF  data  shown  in  Table 4,  the  range  of  bank-debt-to-assets  ratios 
varies  between  0.09  and  0.42  across  manufacturing  industries  (using 
two-digit  SIC codes  to identify  industries).  This type  of variation is not 
surprising,  given  the  differences  in riskiness  and  collateral of different 
industries.  Such variation will probably persist even  after the Big Bang. 
Therefore one would  only  expect  convergence  in the bank-debt-to-asset 
ratio for the entire  manufacturing  sector if the asset  distribution  across 
industries  were the same in both countries.  This suggests  that it is advis- 
able to study  the borrowing  patterns  at the  two-digit  industry  level  (or 
finer). 
One  problem  with  looking  to industry-level  data is that there  is less 
detail  on the size  distribution  of firms within  industries.  The published 
QFR data  only  show  separate  information  for firms with  assets  above 
and below  $25 million.  The published  Quarterly  Report of Incorporate 
Enterprise Statistics includes  no  information  on different-sized  firms in 
each industry.  By getting  unpublished  data from Japan we  were  able to 
make  some  very  rough  comparisons.23  The Japanese  data  cover  firms 
with  capital  above  ?1  billion,  so  there  is a slight  size  mismatch  in the 
comparison.24 The overlap  in industrial  classification  definitions  allows 
us  to match  14 industries  (food;  textiles; pulp  and  paper; printing  and 
publishing;  chemicals;  petroleum  and  coal  products;  stone,  clay  and 
glass; iron and steel; nonferrous  metals;  fabricated metal products;  ma- 
chinery; electrical  and electronic  machinery;  transportation  equipment; 
and precision  machinery). 
Table 7 reports information  on how  large Japanese firms' bank depen- 
dence  has  compared  with  U.S.  firms' bank  dependence  over  time.  For 
the  Japanese  firms  we  show  the  bank-debt-to-asset  ratio in  1980 and 
23. We thank Itsuko Takemura for providing  these  data. 
24. The ?1 billion cutoff is closer to a $10 million cutoff. However,  using the published  data 
on all manufacturing  firms, we verified that the firms with between  $10 and $25 million 
in assets  are of limited importance.  Thus, we believe  that the size mismatch  is not likely 
to mislead  us about the general trends in bank dependence  in the two countries. The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  ?  153 
Table  7  INDUSTRY-LEVEL  COMPARISONS  OF BANK-DEBT-TO-TOTAL- 
ASSETS  RATIO  FOR  LARGE  U.S. AND JAPANESE 
MANUFACTURING  FIRMS 
Japan  1980  Japan  1998 
U.S.  Japan  Japan  minus  minus 
Industry  1998  1980  1998  U.S. 1998  U.S. 1998 
Food  0.1216  0.1925  0.1369  0.0709  0.0153 
Textiles  0.2014  0.3828  0.2465  0.1814  0.0451 
Pulp and paper  0.1167  0.4372  0.3535  0.3205  0.2368 
Printing  and publishing  0.0860  0.0808  0.0852  -0.0052  -0.0008 
Chemicals  0.0758  0.3145  0.1649  0.2387  0.0891 
Petroleum  and coal  0.0240  0.5836  0.4168  0.5596  0.3928 
Stone, glass, and clay  0.1531  0.3708  0.1941  0.2177  0.0410 
Iron and steel  0.1138  0.3924  0.2647  0.2786  0.1509 
Nonferrous metals  0.0726  0.4458  0.3599  0.3732  0.2873 
Metal  products  0.1788  0.3150  0.1738  0.1362  -0.0050 
Machinery  0.0725  0.2415  0.1568  0.1690  0.0843 
Electronic  machinery  0.0497  0.1542  0.0919  0.1045  0.0422 
Transportation  durables  0.0393  0.1479  0.1096  0.1086  0.0703 
Precision  machinery  0.1551  0.1647  0.1020  0.0096  -0.0531 
Average  0.1043  0.3017  0.2040  0.1974  0.0997 
Source:  See text. 
Note: Large U.S.  firms are defined  as those  having  assets  >$25  million. 
1998. Since there is no noticeable  trend in the U.S.  data, we  report only 
the  1998 levels  for the U.S.  industries-using  other years or an average 
of several  years  made  no  difference  in what  follows.  The last two  col- 
umns  of the  table show  the  difference  for each  of  14 industries  in two 
periods.  In 1980, the difference  was  diffusely  distributed between  0 and 
0.56. For the industry  average the difference was 0.197. The table shows 
that  by  1998  the  distribution  had  become  much  more  concentrated 
around  zero.  By 1998, for ten  out  of fourteen  industries,  the Japanese 
bank debt ratios are within  10 percentage  points  of the U.S. ratios. More- 
over,  for  these  ten  industries  the  distribution  of  differences  in  bank 
dependence  is more symmetric,  with three of the ten Japanese industries 
appearing  less bank-dependent  than their U.S.  counterparts. 
Interestingly,  the four industries  where  convergence  has not occurred 
(pulp and paper, nonferrous metals, petroleum,  and iron and steel) are all 
cases  where  a significant  portion  of the Japanese firms have  performed 
poorly.25 We believe  that  for these  depressed  industries  the  effects  of 
25. We thank Bob Uriu for pointing  this out. 154 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
Table  8  INDUSTRY-LEVEL  COMPARISONS  OF THE  RATIO  OF BANK 
DEBT  TO TOTAL  ASSETS  FOR  SMALL  U.S. AND JAPANESE 
MANUFACTURING  FIRMS 
Japan  1980  Japan  1998 
U.S.  Japan  Japan  minus  minus 
Industry  1998  1980  1998  U.S. 1998  U.S. 1998 
Food  0.2637  0.3945  0.4877  0.1308  0.2240 
Textiles  0.1971  0.3300  0.3460  0.1329  0.1489 
Pulp and paper  0.2334  0.2591  0.3910  0.0257  0.1576 
Printing  and publishing  0.1958  0.3115  0.2600  0.1157  0.0642 
Chemicals  0.1775  0.2095  0.2874  0.0320  0.1099 
Petroleum  and coal  0.1763  0.3917  0.2576  0.2154  0.0813 
Stone, glass, and clay  0.2246  0.3068  0.4302  0.0822  0.2056 
Iron and steel  0.1910  0.2818  0.4137  0.0908  0.2227 
Nonferrous metals  0.1977  0.2727  0.4078  0.0750  0.2101 
Metal  products  0.1814  0.2720  0.4000  0.0906  0.2186 
Machinery  0.1865  0.2622  0.3671  0.0757  0.1806 
Electronic  machinery  0.1771  0.2390  0.2632  0.0619  0.0861 
Transportation  durables  0.1795  0.2504  0.3271  0.0709  0.1476 
Precision machinery  0.1295  0.2039  0.3236  0.0744  0.1941 
Average  0.1937  0.2847  0.3545  0.0910  0.1608 
Source:  See text. 
Note:  Small  U.S. firms  are defined as those having assets <$25 million. 
deregulation  are likely  being  masked  by  the  poor  profitability  of  the 
firms; going  to public  debt markets is always  hard for financially  trou- 
bled  firms.  Overall  we  read  the  industry-level  comparisons  as  further 
suggesting  that large Japanese and  U.S.  manufacturing  firms have  be- 
come fairly similar in their bank dependence. 
Table 8 shows  a comparable set of industry differences for small manu- 
facturing firms. The contrast with  the previous  table is striking. For the 
small firms there is no  sign  of convergence,  and if anything  the  differ- 
ences  are larger than in 1980. However,  the differences  were even  larger 
in 1993, so the relative  gap is now  closing.  Nevertheless,  there is still a 
long way  to go. 
3.2 SAVERS'  RESPONSE  TO THE  DEREGULATION 
An  obvious  question  is  why  the  small  and  large  borrowers  fared  so 
differently.  We  believe  that  the  key  to  understanding  the  difference 
comes  from looking  at the behavior  of the banks'  depositors.  Japanese 
households  have  historically  held  the  dominant  part of  their financial The  Japanese  Banking Crisis * 155 
Table  9  RATIOS  OF BANK  DEPOSITS  TO GDP FOR  SELECTED 
YEARS-G7 COUNTRIES 
Addendum: 
(Demand  (Time  (Total  (Nonbank  (Total 
Deposits)/  Deposits)/  Deposits)/  Deposits)/  Deposits)/ 
Country  Year  GDPa  GDPb  GDPa  GDPb,c  Wealthd 
Canada  1983  0.09  0.55  0.63  0.58  0.35 
1996  0.17  0.62  0.79  0.75  0.33 
France  1983  0.18  0.43  0.61  0.46  0.57 
1996  0.20  0.45  0.65  0.68  0.36 
Germany  1983  0.11  0.40  0.50  0.72  0.55 
1996  0.18  0.42  0.60  0.93  0.43 
Italy  1983  0.31  0.36  0.67  0.59  0.35 
1996  0.27  0.25  0.52  0.51  0.33 
Japan  1983  0.21  1.36  1.58  1.50  0.67 
1996  0.28  1.78  2.06  1.43  0.62 
U.K.  1983  0.10  0.25  0.35  0.85  N/A 
1996  N/A  1.06  1.06  0.91  N/A 
U.S.  1983  0.11  0.46  0.57  0.74  0.25 
1996  0.11  0.31  0.42  0.50  0.16 
aInterational Financial  Statistics,  International  Monetary  Fund. This information  includes all institu- 
tions that accept  deposits, not only commercial  banks. 
bBank  Profitability:  Financial  Statements  of Banks,  Statistical  Supplement,  Organization  for Economic  Co- 
operation  and Development,  several  issues. 
CFor  United Kingdom  the data correspond  to 1984.  For  United Kingdom  and Japan,  nonbank  deposits 
include  interbank  deposits. 
dFinancial  Accounts  of OECD  Countries,  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development,  sev- 
eral  issues. 
assets  in  bank  deposits.  The  conventional  explanation  for  this  (e.g., 
Hamada  and  Horiuchi,  1987)  was  the  relatively  low  overall  level  of 
financial assets held by the households  along with  the high transactions 
costs  of  operating  in  immature  capital markets.  Table 9,  which  shows 
the ratios of bank deposits  to GDP for G7 countries,  suggests  that at the 
onset  of deregulation  in 1983 Japan had far more bank deposits  (relative 
to GDP) than  any  of the  other  G7 countries.  The total deposit-to-GDP 
ratio in Japan stood  at 1.58, more than double the ratio for Italy, the next 
highest  country. 
The  table  also  shows  that by  1996 the  picture  had  hardly  changed. 
Japan still  looks  anomalous  in  its  deposit/GDP  ratio.  Figure  1 shows 
yearly  data for the city banks  and confirms  that there were  no unusual 
breaks  in  the  pattern  and  that  even  the  large  commercial  banks  were 156 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
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Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statistics Annual, various  issues. 
gaining  deposits  (relative to GDP) in the last two  decades.  The fact that 
deposits  at the  city banks  account  for only  about  10% of the  deposits 
recorded  in the IMF data is one way  of seeing  the importance  of postal 
savings  accounts.  As  we  discuss  below,  forecasts  of  the  future  of  the 
banking  system  need  to  be  conditioned  on  what  will  happen  to  the 
postal  savings  accounts. 
Why  didn't  the Japanese  savers  prune  their bank  deposits?  One  an- 
swer is that the deposit-to-GDP  ratio may not tell the complete  story. The 
last column  in Table 9 shows  that the ratio of deposits  to wealth fell from 
67% in  1983 to 62% in  1996. So from the  households'  perspective  they 
did  cut  back  slightly  on  their  use  of banks.  Nevertheless,  there  does 
seem  to be a puzzle  as to why  the banking  reliance remained  so strong, 
particularly since  there were  so many  steps  taken to liberalize  financial 
markets during  this time. 
We believe  that there  were  several  features  of the  deregulation  pro- 
cess  that kept  savers  from pulling  their money  out of the banks.  First, 
the deregulation  process  was  very slow  in allowing  individual  investors 
easy  direct access to capital markets.  For example,  participating  directly 
in  the  stock  market  remained  expensive  for individuals  until  very  re- The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  *  157 
cently.  Up  until  April  1998,  commissions  on  trades  as  large  as  ?50 
million  were  still  fixed  and  regulated.  Only  in  October  1999 were  all 
commissions  fully  deregulated.  Similarly, a range  of  activities  includ- 
ing  stock  options  trading  by  individuals,  over-the-counter  trading  of 
equity-related  derivatives,  and trading non-listed  stocks through securi- 
ties  firms  were  prohibited  until  December  1998.  So  prior  to  the  Big 
Bang it was  very  costly  for individual  investors  to participate in capital 
markets directly. 
But the limited direct access only partially explains individuals'  strong 
attachments  to bank deposits.  One  obvious  question  is why  investment 
trusts  (which  have  existed  for many  years)  didn't  draw  money  away 
from banks.  Here  again  regulation  was  important.  Until  1998, invest- 
ment trusts in Japan were limited  to contract-type funds,  and company- 
type  funds  (i.e.,  U.S.-style  mutual  funds)  were  not  allowed.  Further- 
more,  any  investment  trust had  to be  sold  to more  than  50 investors, 
precluding  the possibility  of establishing  funds specialized  for a few rich 
investors,  like many hedge  funds,  vulture  funds,  and LBO funds  in the 
United  States. 
More importantly,  entry  into  the  investment  trust business  was  lim- 
ited by other regulations.  This protection  muted  some  of the incentives 
to improve  the returns on investment  trusts. Since almost all the invest- 
ment  trust  companies  were  subsidiaries  of  securities  companies,  they 
were  often  interested  in  churning  all  the  accounts  they  managed  to 
collect the high commissions  for their parents.  Consequently  the invest- 
ment  trusts had a poor track record, generally  underperforming  market 
indices  by  large  margins  (Cai, Chan,  and  Yamada,  1996; Ohmura  and 
Kawakita,  1992, Chapter 7; Yonezawa and Maru, 1984, p.  31). 
Other financial services  companies  were  barred from offering  invest- 
ment trusts until the 1990s. But even  in the 1990s, when  the entry barri- 
ers finally started to be removed,  the investment  trust companies  were 
still required to get  government  approval  each  time  they  set up  a new 
investment  trust  fund.  The  restriction  remained  until  December  1998 
and stifled competition  in introducing  innovative  products.26 
We believe  these  factors together  significantly  limited  the  options  of 
savers and led them to keep much of their money in the banks. Notice that 
our  explanation  does  not  emphasize  any  attempts  by  banks  to  attract 
funds to take advantage  of their deposit  insurance  guarantees.  This does 
26. When  a career official at the Ministry of Finance was  arrested on corruption  charges, 
the most important favor that he supposedly  provided  to the security firms was quickly 
approving  the prospectuses  of new  investment  funds  that they proposed  (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, March 6, 1998, evening  edition). 158 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
Figure  2 CORPORATE  BOND PURCHASES  BY  SECTOR  (1981-1990) 
Others 
1%  Individuals 
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Financial  Institutions 
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Insurance  Companies 
9% 
Trust  Accounts 
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Source:  Flow-of-funds  accounts;  see text for details. 
not imply that we completely  dismiss  the moral-hazard  stories that have 
been  emphasized  by  others  (e.g.,  Cargill,  Hutchison,  and  Ito,  1997; 
Hutchison,  1998). Rather, we believe that our complementary  explanation 
stressing  the limited  degree  to which  savings  options  were  deregulated 
has been  overlooked. 
Of course,  one might still wonder  who  ended  up buying  all the bonds 
that the companies  issued.  Figure 2 shows  the distribution  of bond pur- 
chases  during the 1980s.27  Consistent  with  our account,  direct individu- 
als' purchases  were  relatively  small.  Given  the aforementioned  impedi- 
ments,  we  do not  find  this  surprising.  Instead,  it appears  that various 
types  of financial institutions  (most notably  insurance  companies,  com- 
27. These  statistics  are built up from flow-of-funds  data that show  owners  of domesticity 
issued  corporate  bonds  including  convertibles  and  warrant  bonds.  The  corporate 
bonds  held by government  financial institutions  are excluded  from the total to isolate 
the corporate bonds  held  by the private  sector. Since the privatization  of NTT in 1985 
and  JR in  1987 reclassified  their  bonds  from  public  bonds  to  corporate  bonds,  the 
number includes  NTT (JR)  bonds  that were issued  before  1985 (1987) and had not been 
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mercial banks,  and trust banks) were  major purchasers,  along with  cor- 
porations  and foreigners.28 
We draw  two  further conclusions  from this  reading  of the  evidence. 
First,  the  Big  Bang  is  likely  to  be  more  important  in  generating  new 
options  for savers  than for borrowers,  who  by 1990 had already gained 
important  alternatives  to bank  financing.  Second,  we  believe  that the 
historical record gives us little quantitative guidance as to how the house- 
holds  will  respond  to  the  Big Bang.  It is clear that the banks  will  face 
significant  new  competition  for funds,  but there is too little evidence  for 
us to make any strong  predictions  about which  competitors  will be the 
most threatening  to the banks.  Banks themselves  are now  allowed  to sell 
investment  trusts over their counters  (since December  1998). This means 
that when  we make our projections  about the future size of the banking 
industry, our calculations will not rely on any specific assumptions  about 
the  future  supply  of  funds  to  the  industry.  Instead,  as  a plausibility 
check  we  will  see  what  our  forecasts  imply  about  future  changes  in 
household  portfolio  decisions. 
3.3 BANKS'  RESPONSES  TO THE  DEREGULATION 
Our account  of the savings  behavior  suggests  that banks had  a bit of a 
windfall  in  that  they  were  able  to  hold  on  to  many  of  their  deposits 
despite  the deregulation.  But the windfall  was  not big enough  to offset 
the  adverse  fallout  from deregulation,  and by the  end  of the  1990s the 
banks  were  in  bad  shape.  While  our  story  clearly  gets  the  timing  of 
events  right,  it  may  not  correctly  characterize  the  causation.  For in- 
stance,  one alternative explanation  is that the Japanese banks are suffer- 
ing now  purely because  of the poor performance  of the overall Japanese 
economy  in the 1990s. While we believe  that macro conditions  played  an 
important  role in shaping  the fate of the industry,  the question  we  care 
about  is  whether  macro  factors  were  all that  mattered.  To assess  this 
question  we  offer several pieces  of evidence. 
The  starting  point  for  our  exploration  is  to  see  how  the  banks  re- 
sponded  under  the  constraints  of  the  prevailing  regulations.  As  men- 
tioned  above,  Japanese banks prior to the Big Bang were not really able 
to move  into the nontraditional  areas of banking  that many  of the other 
global  banks  have  pursued.  To gauge  the  significance  of  these  restric- 
tions  we  compare  the  recent profitability  and  income  sources  for large 
U.S.  and Japanese banks. 
28. At  the  aggregate  level  corporate  borrowing  was  rising,  since  the  large  firms  were 
tapping  the bond markets and the smaller firms were increasing  their bank borrowing. 
The savings  that were funding  this seem to have previously  been going towards financ- 
ing the government  deficit, which  was  falling in the late 1980s. 160 - HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
Table 10  PROFITABILITY  AND NONINTEREST  INCOME:  MAJOR  U.S. 
BANKS,  1976-1996 
Noninterest 
Year  Incomea  ROAb  ROEC 
1976  0.1053  0.0055  0.0919 
1977  0.1024  0.0058  0.1013 
1978  0.0967  0.0062  0.1106 
1979  0.1377  0.0065  0.1185 
1980  0.1294  0.0049  0.0889 
1981  0.1171  0.0036  0.0297 
1982  0.1271  0.0041  0.0481 
1983  0.1431  0.0049  0.0634 
1984  0.1093  0.0055  0.0759 
1985  0.1325  0.0071  0.1287 
1986  0.1448  0.0065  0.1040 
1987  0.1506  0.0003  -0.0135 
1988  0.1513  0.0071  0.1468 
1989  0.1472  0.0041  -0.1150 
1990  0.1527  0.0023  0.0534 
1991  0.1864  0.0056  0.0783 
1992  0.2213  0.0104  0.1384 
1993  0.2465  0.0131  0.1684 
1994  0.2373  0.0127  0.1691 
1995  0.2246  0.0128  0.1645 
1996  0.2535  0.0146  0.1670 
Notes: Data are taken from the December  call report for each year. Each entry is the average over the top 
1% institutions  (according to total assets) of the ratio for the year. All the variable names  in the footnotes 
are extracted from the instructions  for submitting  call reports,  1976-1996. 
aMean ratio of noninterest  income  to total income.  Before 1984, noninterest  income  is computed  as total 
income minus  interest income,  which is the sum of riad4000, riad4020, riad4025, riad4063, riad4065, and 
riad4115. From 1984 onward,  there is a specific  item that keeps  track of nininterest  income  (riad4107). 
Thus,  from 1984 onward,  we  define  noninterest  income  as riad4000 minus  riad4107. 
bMean return on assets,  computed  as net income  (riad4340) divided  by total assets  (rcfd2170). 
CMean  return on equity,  computed  as net income  (riad4340) divided  by total equity  capital (rcfd3210). 
Table 10 shows  data on the U.S.  banks.  Unfortunately,  the regulatory 
reports  from  which  these  data  are  compiled  do  not  directly  provide 
information  on revenue  sources by line of business.  As a crude measure 
of the income  from nontraditional  activities  one  can look at noninterest 
income.  The  table  shows  that  noninterest  income  (relative  to  total in- 
come) has doubled  since the early 1980s. This ratio has climbed  steadily, 
and most banking  experts  use these  figures  to argue that U.S. banks are 
successfully  pushing  into new  lines of business. 
The table also shows  that U.S. bank profitability at the end  of 1990s is The  Japanese  Banking Crisis ? 161 
Table 11  INTEREST  iNCOME,  FEE  INCOME,  RETURN  ON ASSETS,  AND 
RETURN  ON EQUITY  FOR  JAPANESE  CITY  BANKS 
Year  RINTa  RLINTb  RFEEC  ROCURd  ROAe  ROEf  AROAg 
1976  0.9317  0.7152  0.0359  0.0024  NA  NA  NA 
1977  0.9314  0.6980  0.0375  0.0028  0.0013  0.0528  0.0028 
1978  0.8967  0.6385  0.0415  0.0047  0.0012  0.0476  0.0026 
1979  0.8965  0.5876  0.0451  0.0031  0.0012  0.0484  0.0026 
1980  0.8987  0.5568  0.0347  0.0025  0.0007  0.0300  0.0013 
1981  0.9292  0.5760  0.0286  0.0019  0.0009  0.0425  0.0017 
1982  0.9320  0.5163  0.0298  0.0015  0.0022  0.1094  0.0047 
1983  0.9388  0.5192  0.0308  0.0014  0.0020  0.1030  0.0047 
1984  0.9362  0.5482  0.0323  0.0015  0.0024  0.1297  0.0053 
1985  0.9380  0.5091  0.0288  0.0014  0.0023  0.1190  0.0051 
1986  0.9236  0.5541  0.0319  0.0018  0.0022  0.1213  0.0044 
1987  0.8965  0.5301  0.0337  0.0030  0.0026  0.1341  0.0059 
1988  0.8463  0.4764  0.0323  0.0036  0.0030  0.1541  0.0070 
1989  0.8338  0.4867  0.0310  0.0940  0.0036  0.1617  0.0031 
1990  0.8690  0.4894  0.0267  0.0696  0.0027  0.1073  0.0009 
1991  0.9075  0.5857  0.0236  0.0364  0.0019  0.0683  0.0014 
1992  0.9103  0.6213  0.0242  0.0424  0.0014  0.0465  0.0022 
1993  0.9205  0.6091  0.0313  0.0153  0.0008  0.0248  0.0023 
1994  0.8482  0.5324  0.0355  0.0651  0.0007  0.0212  -0.0012 
1995  0.8011  0.4679  0.0361  0.1224  -0.0002  -0.0046  -0.0045 
1996  0.8074  0.3906  0.0363  0.0867  -0.0042  -0.1171  -0.0077 
1997  0.7916  0.3710  0.0410  0.1188  -0.0001  -0.0040  -0.0024 
Note:  Data  are from  the Nikkei Database  for the accounting  year ending in March  of each year. 
aProportion  of interest  income  in the current  income. 
bProportion  of interest  income  on loans in the current  income. 
CProportion  of fee income  in the current  income. 
dProportion  of the other  current  income, including  realized  capital  gains on securities. 
eAfter-tax  net income  divided by total  assets from  March  of the previous  year. 
fAfter-tax  net income divided by total capital  (capital  plus reserves)  from March  of the previous year. 
gAdjusted  ROA: (current  profits -  gains from sales of the securities +  losses from sales from the 
securities  + losses from  revaluation  of securities)/(total  assets from  March  of the previous  year). 
at near-record levels.  The U.S. banks successfully  rebounded  from their 
very  poor performance  in the late  1980s. The initial recovery  may have 
been  partly due to luck, because  the steep  U.S. yield  curve made it very 
easy for banks to make money  by taking in deposits  and investing  them 
in  government  securities.  However,  even  as  the  U.S.  yield  curve  has 
flattened  out,  U.S.  bank  profits  have  remained  high,  and  during  this 
time the percentage  of noninterest  income  has continued  to grow. 
Table 11 shows  similar data for large Japanese banks.  Perhaps surpris- 
ingly,  they  have  about  the  same  fraction  of revenue  coming  from fee- 162 *  HOSHI & KASHYAP 
Figure 3 PROPORTION OF LOANS TO SMALL ENTERPRISES  (1973-1997) 
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Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statistics Annual, various  issues. 
based activities in the late 1990s as in the early 1980s. Although  during the 
1990s the banks have  made  a lower  fraction of income  from interest  re- 
ceipts,  most  of the  decline  has been  due  to an increase  in capital gains 
realized by selling securities.29 Put differently, the total of interest income 
and  "other" income  has hardly  changed  in Japan. The table also shows 
how profitability (measured by either return on assets or return on equity) 
has deteriorated in the 1990s (even more so than the U.S. banks in the late 
1980s.) Interestingly,  the raw ROA levels  (shown  in the third-to-last col- 
umn) are typically higher than the adjusted ROA levels,  which omit gains 
and  losses  from  securities  sales  (and  are shown  in the  last  column).30 
Thus,  it appears  that the banks  have  tried to mask  some  of the perfor- 
mance deterioration by realizing  capital gains on securities holdings. 
While  the  Japanese  banks  have  yet  to  expand  much  into  nontradi- 
29. This shows the practice referred  to as fukumi  keiei,  hidden asset management. The 
Japanese  banks and large firms  often hold shares which were purchased  long ago and 
therefore  have unrealized capital gains. These firms sometimes try to smooth their 
earnings by selling the shares when operating profits are low. Table 11 shows this 
clearly.  To protect their cross-shareholding  the sellers often buy back the shares after 
realizing  the capital  gains. 
30. The  corrected  return  on  assets  is  calculated  as  (current profits-gains  from  sales  of 
stocks  and other securities  +  losses  from sales  of stocks  and other securities  +  losses 
from devaluation  of stock holdings)/(total  assets at the beginning of the period). The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis * 163 
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tional  lines  of  business,  they  did  reorganize  their  traditional  lending 
patterns.  Figure  3  shows  the  proportion  of  bank  loans  to  small  enter- 
prises.31  The  graph  shows  a dramatic  increase  in  small  business  lending 
in  the  1980s.  As  the  banks  started  to lose  their  large  customers  to capital 
markets,  they  went  after  small  firms.  Most  observers  agree  that  previ- 
ously  the  banks  had  not  had  close  ties  to many  of  these  smaller  borrow- 
ers.  We return  to  this  point  below. 
Figure  4 shows  a second  aspect  of the  banks'  portfolio  shift:  increasing 
loans  to the  real  estate  industry.  The  proportion  of loans  to the  real estate 
industry  started  to soar  in the  beginning  of 1980s  and  soon  surpassed  the 
previous  peak,  which  had  occurred  during  the  Japanese  Archipelago 
rebuilding  boom  of  1972-1973.  By  the  early  1990s,  the  proportion  of 
loans  to  the  real  estate  industry  by  banks  had  doubled  from  its  level  in 
the  early  1980s. 
A third  change  in the  banks'  behavior,  which  has  been  emphasized  by 
Peek  and  Rosengren  (1997a,  b),  was  a  noticeable  increase  in  foreign 
31. These  data are taken from the Bank  of Japan  Economic  Statistics Monthly. The small firms 
here are defined  to be those that are not large according to the Bank of Japan definition: 
large firms are those  firms which  have more than ?100 million in equity and more than 
300 regular employees.  The definition  of small firms here roughly  corresponds  to that 
in the other tables in this paper. 164 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
lending.  As they  explain,  in some  cases  this lending  was  done  through 
separately  capitalized  subsidiaries  so that not all the loans  would  show 
up on the parent bank's balance  sheets.  Peek and Rosengren's  analysis 
shows  that the foreign  activity has dramatically slowed  in the 1990s. 
One  way  to evaluate  the portfolio  shifts  and performance  is to see  if 
they  might  have  represented  a natural response  to the underlying  eco- 
nomic conditions.  After all, land prices were soaring in the late 1980s, so 
perhaps the shift into property-based  lending was simply in keeping with 
past practices. To explore how  much of the banks' performance  might be 
attributable to basic economic  conditions,  we ran several  regressions. 
The dependent  variable for the  regressions  is the adjusted  return on 
assets  (AROA) for city banks,  which  was  shown  in the  last column  of 
Table 11. As a robustness  check we also tried the same regressions  using 
the  raw  ROA series  and  found  the  same  basic  patterns.  The  adjusted 
ROA series is graphed  in Figure 5. The figure shows  that Japanese bank 
performance  slowly  declined  from the mid-1950s  through  the 1980s and 
then  sharply deteriorated  in the 1990s. 
To determine  the role of deregulation  on performance  one would  like 
to include  a proxy for deregulation  in a full-blown  model  of bank profit- 
ability. Unfortunately,  we  lack not  only  a compelling  theoretical  model 
that makes  tight predictions  about the exact determinants  of (adjusted) 
ROA, but also convincing  proxies  for the impact of deregulation.  Given 
these  limitations,  we  take the  indirect and admittedly  ad hoc  approach 
of looking  only to see whether  the dynamics  for ROA changed  following 
deregulation.  Operationally  our strategy  amounts  to checking  whether 
there  is  a stable  relation  between  ROA and  standard  macroeconomic 
variables before and after 1983 (the date at which  we argue the deregula- 
tion of the bond  market began  in earnest.)  Thus,  our modest  goal is to 
provide  evidence  against  a story that posits  that macro factors can fully 
explain  the banks' performance  after the onset  of deregulation. 
We  considered  interest  rates,  land  prices,  stock  prices,  and  GDP 
growth  to be the baseline  set of macroeconomic  variables  that could  be 
plausibly  justified  as  determinants  of ROA. Intuitively,  these  variables 
allow for monetary policy, collateral, and general economic  conditions  to 
drive bank performance.  Because we had just under 30 years of data and 
did  not  have  much  guidance  about  how  many  lags  to allow  for in the 
regressions,  we  did almost  no  experimenting  with  other variables.  The 
one  exception  was  inflation,  which  we  measured  using  the GDP defla- 
tor; we  found  no independent  effect of controlling  for inflation. 
Data limitations  largely drove  our choices  of the specific proxies  used 
in the regressions.  In particular, the call rate (which  measures  the price 
of  overnight  credit between  banks)  is the  only  consistent  interest-rate The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  * 165 








Source:  Ministry  of Finance, Banking  Bureau  Annual  Report,  various issues, and Nikkei Database.  Raw 
ROA  has been adjusted  for gains and losses due to sale or revaluation  of equity  holdings. 
series  that is  available  from the  1950s onward.  We take the  difference 
between  the nominal  call rate and the current year's inflation to form our 
real call-rate series.32 
Similarly, the only consistent  land price data come from a semiannual 
survey  conducted  by the Japan Real Estate Research Institute.  One  sur- 
vey  covers  all land  prices  nationwide,  and  the  other  pertains  to  land 
prices in the six major metropolitan  areas. The logarithmic  differences in 
both  series  (again  subtracting  inflation)  are graphed  in  Figure  6.  This 
graph  also  shows  the  logarithmic  difference  of the TOPIX stock return 
index  and inflation. 
The figure shows  three important  things.  First, the stock return series 
is much more volatile than either land price series.  Large swings  in stock 
prices routinely  occurred throughout  the period.  Second,  large changes 
in the relative price of land also had happened  several times prior to the 
late 1980s. Furthermore,  the land price changes  were  not always  coinci- 
dent with  the swings  in stock prices. This is important because  it means 
that we  have  some  hope  of identifying  the econometric  connection  be- 
tween  land prices,  stock prices, and bank profits.  Finally, the figure also 
32. Using  instead  the  nominal  call rate along  with  a separate  inflation  variable made  no 
difference  in what  follows. 166 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
Figure  6 PERCENTAGE  REAL  CHANGE  IN LAND AND STOCK  PRICES 
(1957-1997) 
I  --Average  Land  Prices -I-UUban  Land  Prices --  TOPIX  Stock  Index 
Sources:  Japan  Real  Estate  Research  Institute  and Tokyo  Stock  Exchange. 
Note:  All nominal  data  are converted  to constant  prices  using the GDP  deflator. 
shows  that the choice  of which  land price series  to use  could be poten- 
tially important.  The late  1980s land  price  run-up  was  concentrated  in 
the major cities. 
Two representative  regression  specifications  among  those we tried are 
shown  in Table 12. One  key  issue  is how  to account  for the  long-term 
decline in profitability documented  in Figure 5. In the first pair of regres- 
sions  (which  differ only  in which  land price is used)  we  include  a time 
trend in addition  to the macroeconomic  variables.  We draw two conclu- 
sions  from these  regressions.  First, and not surprisingly,  the time trend 
is the most important variable in the equation.  Second,  aside from stock 
prices,  which  are of borderline  importance,  most  of the macro variables 
appear to have no correlation with bank profitability. 
The next two columns  repeat the first specification  except that a lagged 
dependent  variable  is  added.  The  addition  of  the  lagged  dependent 
variable  marginally  improves  the  R2 and  wipes  out  the  explanatory 
power  of the time trend. The t-statistics of several of the macro variables The Japanese  Banking  Crisis * 167 
Table 12  REGRESSIONS RELATING BANKS' RETURN ON ASSETS AND 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
(Dependent  variable is city banks' adjusted  return on assets; sample 
Period is 1957-1983.) 
Coefficient  and  (t-statistic) 
Variable  Regression  1  2  3  4 
Intercept 
Time trend 
Real  GDP  growth 
Real GDP growth  (-  (- 
Real  GDP growth (t-1) 
Log change  in real 
average land price 
Log change  in real 
average land price (t-1) 
Log change  in real 
urban land price 
Log change  in real 
urban land price (t-  1) 
Real call rate 
Real call rate (t-l) 
(- 
ROA (t-l) 
Log change  in real 
equity  prices 
Log change  in real 
equity prices (t-1) 
R2 
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P-Values from Tests for the Equality of Coefficients  after 1984 
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rise, but the tests  on the statistical significance  of the sum  of the coeffi- 
cients,  shown  at the bottom  of the table, continue  to indicate  that only 
the stock price coefficients  are likely to be different from zero. This same 
pattern  turned  up  in  all of  the  variations  that  we  tried  that  included 
lagged  dependent  variables.  From  this  we  conclude  that  prior  to  the 
mid-1980s  there  was  at best  a loose  link between  macro variables  and 
bank profitability. 
For both specifications  we then checked how they fit after 1983. Figures 
7 and  8 compare  the  actual values  and  fitted values  for the  regression 
specification  including  average  land  prices  (regressions  1 and  3 in the 
table). Importantly, the fitted values  are one-step-ahead  forecasts,  so the 
actual values  of the right-hand variables are being used  in forming these 
predictions.  By taking this approach rather than going with a full dynamic 
simulation we are giving the prediction equation its best chance at explain- 
ing the postderegulation  events. 
Our main conclusion  from the figures is that the macro variables  lead 
to  an  underprediction  of  bank  ROA  in  the  late  1980s  and  an  over- 
prediction  in  the  1990s.  This  is  most  clearly  seen  in  Figure  7  (which 
shows  the results when  there is no lagged  dependent  variable), but even 
in  Figure  8,  where  the  lagged  dependent  variable  keeps  the  forecasts The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  ?  169 












\%  \b  \  \s  '\ 
/9o 
\%  \%  \  \  \?  \ 
X  X  X  / 
\ 
X 
[-  Actul -m-  Predicted  P 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  the regression  coefficients  from regression  3 in Table 12. 
more closely  on track, the 1988 and 1989 peaks  are underestimated  and 
the last few  years of the sample  are overestimated.  This evidence  leads 
us to doubt  stories which  argue that the formation  of the bubble and its 
bursting  can fully  explain  the  banks'  performance  over  the  last  fifteen 
years. 
An alternative way to judge  the stability of the models  is to check for a 
structural break in the coefficients.  Having  only  15 years of data in the 
deregulated  era led us to suspect  that this type  of test would  have very 
little power.  Nevertheless,  the  tests  for structural breaks shown  in the 
bottom half of the table indicate that none  of the four equations  is stable 
across the two regimes.  In each case we can decisively  reject the hypothe- 
sis  of  no  change  in  the  coefficients.  In  addition  to  being  statistically 
different  across the two  periods,  the differences  also appear to be large 
in terms of their economic  implications.  For instance,  many of the coeffi- 
cients reverse their signs  and the magnitude  of the coefficient  on lagged 
dependent  variable  also  moves  noticeably.  Overall  the  tests  for coeffi- 
cient stability  also confirm the inability  of a set of stable macro correla- 
tions to explain  the recent ROA data. 
While we view  this evidence  as suggestive,  we recognize  that there are 
clear limitations  to how  hard we  can lean  on  the  lack of a well-fitting 170 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
time-series  model  for bank profitability.  Our preferred interpretation  of 
the Table 12 results is that the deregulation  pushed  the banks to alter their 
business  practices  so  that  their  exposure  to  macroeconomic  factors 
changed.  But it is also possible  that we have simply failed to control for the 
correct macro factors and that the poor specification of our model is mask- 
ing the truth. 
We believe  a stronger  test  of  the  importance  of deregulation  can be 
conducted  by  looking  at cross-bank  differences  in performance.  If our 
story emphasizing  the role of deregulation  is correct, then  those  banks 
which  relied more heavily  on loans to customers  who  obtained  access to 
capital markets should  have  underperformed  after deregulation.  To test 
this hypothesis  we check whether bank performance in the postderegula- 
tion period  is negatively  correlated with  the bank's prederegulation  de- 
pendence  on bank loans  to traditional customers. 
In this analysis we continue  to date the start of the deregulation  period 
as fiscal year 1983. Our performance  measure  is again return on assets 
corrected for the gains and losses  from stock sales and the revaluation  of 
stock holdings.  To measure  postderegulation  performance  we use a time 
average  of  this  variable.  Time  averaging  allows  us  to avoid  being  too 
dependent  on  correctly  specifying  the  exact  dates  of  the  adjustment 
period.  However,  it could  also mean that we  are including  observations 
when  the  response  to  deregulation  had  yet  to  begin  or  was  already 
complete.  To guard  against  this  possibility  we  consider  two  different 
averaging  intervals.  We first use  the  average  return for 1991-1997.  We 
then  also  use  the  average  for  1984-1997  so  that  we  pick  up  both  the 
boom  in the late 1980s and the stagnation  in the 1990s. 
We  consider  two  types  of  prederegulation  bank  characteristics  that 
could influence  the postderegulation  performance.  One factor is a bank's 
reliance on income  from traditional activities.  We expect banks intensive 
in traditional activities to have fared (relatively) badly in the deregulation 
environment.  As a proxy we  use the proportion  of current income  com- 
ing from interest on loans.  If this proportion  is high,  it indicates  that the 
bank's performance  was  relatively  dependent  on traditional activities  at 
the onset  of the reforms. 
A  second  factor relates  to  the  bank's  customer  base  at the  onset  of 
deregulation.  Ideally  we  would  like  to  know  which  banks  had  many 
customers  that were  eligible  to  shift  to bond  financing.  Unfortunately, 
data on the the external financing options  for the bank customers  are not 
available. We were  able to collect information  on the proportion  of loans 
made to listed firms and the proportion  of loans made to manufacturing 
firms. Given  that the listed  firms are typically  large and are required to The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  ?  171 
release  audited  information  on  their  performance,  we  think  this  is  a 
fairly good  proxy.  We expect  the  banks  that had  a higher  exposure  to 
listed  firms to have been  at more risk of losing  customers  to the capital 
markets.  We also know  that the size-based  standards  of the bond  issu- 
ance  rules  made  it easier  for manufacturing  firms  to  go  to the  capital 
markets  in  the  1980s.  Thus,  we  also  expect  the  banks  that  had  more 
clients  in the  manufacturing  industry  to have  also been  more  likely  to 
lose  customers. 
All  the  data  except  for  the  listed  company  loan  shares  come  from 
Nikkei  database  on  bank  balance  sheets  and  income  statements.  The 
data  on  the  loan  shares  were  collected  from  Keizai  Chosakai's  annual 
publication  Kin'yu Kikan no Toyushi. The sample  for the  regressions  in- 
cludes  10 city banks,  3 long-term  credit banks,  6 trust banks,  64 regional 
banks,  and 60 second-tier  regional banks.33 
Table 13 shows  the estimation  results.  Each column  reports the coeffi- 
cient estimates  and their t-statistics for a different regression  model.  We 
draw several conclusions  from this table. First, the proportion  of interest 
on loans  in the current income  in 1983 is significantly  negatively  corre- 
lated  with  the postderegulation  performance.  The correlation  seems  to 
be  robust,  as it turned  up  in all the  specifications  that we  considered. 
Second,  the proportion  of loans  to listed  firms is also negatively  corre- 
lated with postderegulation  performance,  although  the statistical signifi- 
cance  of  the  coefficient  is  marginal  when  the  average  for whole  post- 
deregulation  period  (1984-1997)  is  used.34  Finally,  the  proportion  of 
loans  to manufacturing  industry  in 1983 is also  significantly  negatively 
correlated with the postderegulation  performance.  We read these  results 
as saying  the  firms that were  more  at risk because  of the  deregulation 
did seem  to underperform  after 1983. 
Returning  to the  big picture,  there  are several  ways  to interpret  the 
differences  in  the  paths  taken  by  the  U.S.  and  Japanese  banks.  One 
interpretation  is  that  the  Japanese  banks  had  a  different  vision  of 
the future of the industry  and pursued  that vision.  For instance,  maybe 
33. Nippon  Trust and  Banking  was  excluded  from  the  analysis  because  its  return  on 
assets  is  dramatically  lower  than  all  the  other  banks  in  the  sample  for  the  1990s. 
Including  this bank noticeably  changes  the results,  especially  the ones  concerning  the 
effect  of loans  to listed  firms.  There are some  other  trust banks  and long-term  credit 
banks  that  experienced  very  low  return  on  assets  for the  1990s,  but  none  of  them 
individually  influences  the regression  results  in any significant  way. When we  ran the 
same  set  of  regressions  excluding  all  trust  banks  and  long-term  credit  banks,  we 
obtained  qualitatively  similar results. 
34. One problem  with  using  listed  firms is that we  do not know  if they in fact qualified to 
issue  bonds.  For some  of the  smaller  listed  firms the bias in the bond  issuance  rules 
may have been  a problem. Table 13  CROSS-SECTION REGRESSIONS RELATING POSTDEREGULATION RETURN ON  ASSETS WITH 
PREDEREGULATION BANK CHARACTERISTICS 
Dependent Variable  Is  Dependent Variable  Is 
Adjusted Return on Assets, 1991-1997  Adjusted Return on Assets, 1984-1997 
Independent  Variable  Model 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
City-bank dummy  0.00281  0.00042  0.00129  0.01114  0.00619  0.00246  0.00245  0.01034 
(1.165)  (0.385)  (0.942)  (3.875)  (3.432)  (3.139)  (2.604)  (4.797) 
Long-term credit dummy  0.00076  -0.00232  0.00094  0.01181  0.00508  0.00066  0.00157  0.01041 
(0.269)  (-1.395)  (0.353)  (3.103)  (2.413)  (0.593)  (0.933)  (3.804) 
Trust-bank dummy 
Regional-bank  I dummy 
Regional-bank  II dummy 
-0.00155  -0.00204  0.01426  0.02019  0.00478  0.00317  0.00914  0.01448 
(-1.002)  (-1.756)  (2.410)  (3.230)  (4.277)  (3.995)  (2.206)  (3.235) 
0.00904  0.00490  0.00375  0.01544  0.01065  0.00532  0.00460  0.01396 
(3.064)  (7.003)  (11.154)  (5.319)  (4.667)  (10.306)  (18.479)  (5.994) 
0.00948  0.00407  0.00272  0.01526  0.01100  0.00462  0.00388  0.01399 
(2.863)  (7.527)  (10.591)  (4.802)  (4.342)  (10.635)  (19.752)  (5.538) 
1983 interest on loans  -0.00898 
relative to current income  (-2.092) 
1983 fraction of loans to 
manufacturing  firms 
1983 fraction of loans to 
publicly traded firms 




-0.01463  -0.00927 
(-3.658)  (-2.833) 
-0.00637 
(-2.420) 
-0.01589  -0.01579 
(-3.165)  (-3.040) 








-0.00612  -0.00670 
(-1.719)  (-1.747) 
.326  .387 
Dependent  variable:  return  on assets adjusted  for gains and losses of stock sales averaged  over either 1991-1997  or 1984-1997.  Mean of dependent variable:  0.001901 
(average  for 1991-1997);  0.003931  (average  for 1984-1997).  Independent  variables  are measured  for accounting  year ending in the March  of 1983. 
The 143 observations  include data for ten city banks, three long-term  credit  banks, six trust banks (excluding  Nippon Trust),  64 regional  banks, and 60 second-tier 
regional  banks. Each  column shows coefficient  estimates for a separate  regression model. Numbers in the parentheses  below coefficients  are t-statistics,  calculated 
using a heteroskedastic  consistent  covariance  matrix  following  White (1980). The  Japanese  Banking Crisis * 173 
the strong Japanese growth  in the late 1980s led the banks to assess  the 
profitability  of  various  strategic  options  differently  than  U.S.  banks 
(which  were  trying to recover from the bad loans  they had extended  in 
Latin America). We believe  the regression  evidence  in the last two tables 
casts  some  doubt  on this explanation,  but perhaps  a more  complicated 
story  involving  incorrect  future  beliefs  could  explain  the  performance 
data.  In this  case,  the  fact the Japanese strategy  may not  have  worked 
out is more of an accident than anything  that was  caused  by the regula- 
tory regime. 
A  second  reading  of  the  evidence  is  that  the  Japanese  banks  were 
constrained  by  the  regulation  from taking  the  path  of the  U.S.  banks. 
Since  many  fee-generating  lines  of  business  were  not  available,  the 
banks chose  to move  into property-related  lending  and lending  more to 
small firms, perhaps  knowing  that this involved  taking  on more risk.35 
This  was  not  the  only  option  for  the  banks.  When  large  customers 
started  to  leave  bank  financing,  the  banks  could  have  started  buying 
government  bonds  and  other securities  instead  of lending  to new  cus- 
tomers.  We know  now both that this strategy looked  relatively attractive 
and that few, if any, banks in Japan followed  it. Regardless  of what  one 
decides  about the rationality of the banks' responses,  it seems  clear that 
banks  would  never  have  chosen  to search  for new  lines  of business  if 
their large customers had not shifted their financing patterns in response 
to  the  deregulation.  In  this  sense,  the  regulatory  mix  seems  to  have 
mattered,  and one interpretation  of our findings  is that the poor perfor- 
mance was partially due to the deregulation. 
For the purposes  of looking  ahead,  it may not matter whether  we  can 
separate  these two alternatives.  At this point the Japanese banks remain 
among  the largest in the world,  yet they are now  among  the least profit- 
able. Moreover, the approach of sticking to traditional banking and focus- 
ing on new,  smaller customers has failed. As Hoshi and Kashyap (1999b) 
show,  foreign  firms and nonbank  financial  firms are moving  quickly to 
compete  with  banks for funds.  It seems  reasonable  to conclude  that the 
Japanese banks  are going  to be pushed  by all of these  considerations  to 
shift  their  strategy  and  become  more  like  U.S.  banks.  But the  current 
conditions  of the industry  may place some  constraints  on which  options 
are achievable.  Thus, before making any forecasts, we briefly review  the 
current conditions  of the banks. 
35. At least ex post, property  lending was risky.  For example, four major  banks (Sanwa, 
Sumitomo,  Dai-ichi  Kangyo,  and  Tokyo-Mitsubishi)  published  data  showing  non- 
performing  loans broken out by the industry  For these banks, between  16% and 40% of 
total nonperforming  loans are to the real estate sector, and for all the banks besides  Dai- 
ichi Kangyo this is the leading  sector for nonperforming  loans. 174 - HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
4.  The  Bad-Loans  Problem 
While it is widely  recognized  that Japanese banks are in bad shape,  there 
appears  to be  little  consensus  on  the  magnitude  of the  problems.  For 
instance,  in early February 1999 a top Ministry of Finance official (Eisuke 
Sakakibara) was  quoted  as saying  that the financial crisis would  be over 
within  a matter of weeks.  At the time private-sector  analysts were argu- 
ing  that  conditions  were  deteriorating  and  that bold  new  steps  were 
needed.  Such conflicting  opinions  have been common  for the last several 
years. 
One problem plaguing  the entire discussion  is that there is no common 
standard  for what  people  mean  when  they  refer to  "bad loans."  One 
reason  for this  ambiguity  is  that  the  standards  for determining  which 
loans the banks identify  as being at risk on their financial statements  have 
varied over time.  A second  problem  is that numbers  from the bank bal- 
ance sheets  are only one of three types of estimates  which  are sometimes 
used  to identify  loans that are at risk. Unfortunately,  these three types  of 
estimates  are not even intended  to measure  the same thing,  and for each 
approach  there  are judgmental  decisions  that  can  swing  the  numbers 
considerably.  As  we  now  show,  these  considerations  explain  why,  to a 
casual observer, there have been such divergent claims about the scope of 
the banking crisis in Japan. After having clarified the size of the problem, 
we  then discuss  its implications  for the future. 
4.1 ESTIMATES  BASED  ON DATA  FROM  BANKS' 
FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS 
Remarkably, Japanese banks  did not disclose  anything  about the extent 
of  their  problem  loans  prior  to  1993.  This  lack  of  disclosure  made  it 
impossible  to say very much about the condition  of the banks. Since 1993 
the  banks  have  included  footnotes  on  their  financial  statements  that 
classify  loans  according  to  the  health  of  the  borrowers.  The  decisions 
about which  loans should  be identified  in the footnotes  have been  made 
by  the  Japanese  Bankers  Association  (Zenginkyo).  Importantly,  these 
voluntarily  disclosed  data  are not  supposed  to  take  account  of  differ- 
ences  in the chances  the different loans might be repaid (say because  of 
differences  in the collateral associated  with  the loans).  For example,  if a 
borrower  files  for bankruptcy,  all the  loans  made  to  the  borrower  are 
treated equivalently. 
Table 14 shows  these  voluntarily  disclosed  data for 1993 through  1998. 
The first half of the table shows  information  for major banks (city banks, 
trust banks,  and long-term  credit banks), and the second  part shows  the 
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From March 1993 to September  1995, the statistics covered only the loans 
to  failed  enterprises  and  the  loans  for which  no  payments  had  been 
made for at least 6 months.  Thus, the figures did not include  any restruc- 
tured  loans.  Moreover,  regional  banks  did  not  have  to  disclose  (and 
many chose  not to disclose)  the loans with suspended  payments.  Under 
this  reporting  convention  the  amount  of bad  loans  fluctuated  around 
?12  trillion  (roughly  3.5%  of  total  loans)  for  major banks  and  ?13.5 
trillion (roughly 2.5% of total loans) for all banks. 
For the major banks,  intermittent  data on loan write-offs  are available 
for this period  from the  Web site of the  Financial Supervisory  Agency. 
These  data, shown  in the third column  of the table, indicate  that write- 
offs were  quite  low  in these  first couple  of years  of the banking  crisis. 
The  fourth  and  seventh  columns  of  the  table  show  that  during  this 
period  the banks  were  also slow  in increasing  the amount  of funds  set 
aside to cover the bad loans.  Although  provisioning  was increasing,  the 
loan loss reserves  were never sufficient to cover the expected  losses.  For 
instance,  as of September  1995, the loan loss reserves  covered  only 52% 
of bad  loans  for major banks  (and  60% for all banks).  Analysts  in the 
private  sector repeatedly  argued  that the  reported  data grossly  under- 
stated the true extent of the problems.  For example,  Ohara (1996) argued 
that as of March 1995 the bad loans for the major banks were more likely 
to be as large as ?75  trillion,  once  all the restructured  loans  and future 
liabilities of the affiliated nonbanks  were  properly accounted. 
Starting with  the accounting  data released  in March 1996, a couple  of 
changes  were  made.  First, the  regional  banks  were  now  instructed  to 
classify  any loans with  suspended  payments  as bad. More importantly, 
the  bad-loan  definition  was  expanded  to  include  loans  for which  the 
interest rates were  cut to levels  below  the Bank of Japan discount  rate at 
the  time  of  the  concession.  These  changes  led  to a sharp jump  in the 
reported figures (with the totals rising to ?20 trillion for major banks and 
almost ?27  trillion for all banks).  At the same  time the amount  of write- 
offs jumped. 
The accounting  data released in the following  March included  another 
change in definition,  as loans to enterprises  undergoing  creditor-assisted 
restructuring  were  now  included.  Although  the  definition  was  ex- 
panded,  the  amount  of bad  loans  declined  slightly  (to ?18  trillion for 
major banks  and  ?24  trillion  for  all banks).  The  amount  of  loan  loss 
reserves  also declined  by ?1  trillion for major banks and by ?1.2  trillion 
for all banks.  One contributing  factor to the declines  was an acceleration 
in  the  actual  write-offs  (which  remove  bad  assets  from  the  balance 
sheets).  A second  factor that probably helped  was  the brief recovery  of 
the Japanese economy  in 1996. Table 14  PROBLEM LOAN STATISTICS FOR JAPANESE BANKS: 1993-1998  (BILLION YEN) 
Major Banks  All Banks 
Cumulative  Special Reserves  Cumulative  Special Reserves 
Date  Bad Loans  Write-offsa  for Loan Losses  Bad Loans  Write-offs"  for Loan Losses 
March 1993  11,730  424  3,699  12,685  N/A  4,876 
September  1993  12,662  N/A  3,875  13,732  N/A  5,128 
March 1994  12,472  2,514  4,547  13,659  N/A  5,967 
September  1994  12,198  N/A  4,798  13,439  N/A  6,327 
March 1995  11,637  5,322  5,537  12,961  N/A  7,305 
September  1995  11,969  N/A  6,173  13,421  N/A  8,047 
March 1996  20,357  10,812  10,345  26,831  11,602  13,469 
September  1996  18,846  N/A  9,508  24,383  N/A  12,035 
March 1997  18,447  14,488  9,388  23,987  15,918  12,299 
September  1997  17,890  N/A  10,330  23,896  N/A  13,685 
March 1998  21,978  17,988  13,601  29,758  19,911  17,815 
September  1998  22,008  18,653  12,457  30,078  19,630  16,932 
March 1999  20,250  22,256  9,258  29,627  24,620  14,797 
Sources:  Federation  of Bankers Associations  of Japan, Analysis of Financial Statements of All Banks, various  issues.  Federation  of Bankers Associations  of Japan, 
Analysts of Interim  Financial Statements  of All Banks, various issues.  Financial Supervisory  Agency  (FSA), "The status of risk management  loans held by all banks 
in Japan (as of the end of September,  1998)," press  release,  January 22, 1999 and FSA, "The status of risk management  loans held by all banks in Japan (as of 
the end of March 1999)," press  release,  July 23, 1999. 
Notes: Definitions  of bad  loans:  From March,  1993 to September,  1995,  for major banks,  loans  for failed  enterprises  and  loans  whose  payment  had  been 
suspended  for 6 months  or more; for regional banks,  only loans for failed enterprises.  From March, 1996 to September  1996, loans  for failed enterprises,  loans 
whose  payment  had been  suspended  for 6 months  or more,  and loans with interest rates lowered  below  the BOJ discount  rate at the time of the rate cut. From 
March 1997 to September  1997, loans for failed enterprises,  loans whose  payment  had been suspended  for 6 months  or more, loans with interest rates lowered 
below  the BOJ  discount  rate at the time of the rate cut, and loans for enterprises  under restructuring.  For March 1998, loans  for failed enterprises,  loans whose 
payment  had been  suspended  for 3 months  or more,  and loans with  relaxed conditions. 
Coverage: From March 1993 to September  1995, the numbers  are for 21 major banks (11 city banks,  7 trust banks,  3 long-term  credit banks) and 151 banks in all 
(64 regional banks and 66 second-tier  regional banks in addition  to the major banks).  Hyogo  Bank, which  was  closed  in 1995 and reopened  with  a new  name 
(Midori Bank) and organization,  is not included  in the numbers  for March 1996 and later. The merger between  Mitsubishi  Bank and Bank of Tokyo in April of 
1996 (to form Mitsubishi  Bank of Tokyo) reduced  the number  of city banks by one.  Taiheiyo  Bank (later Wakashio  Bank) and Hanwa  Bank failed in 1996 and 
dropped  out of the sample,  starting in March 1997. Hokkaido  Takushoku  Bank, one of the major banks,  failed in 1997 and dropped  out of the sample  in March 
1998. Tokuyo  City,  Kyoto  Kyoei,  Naniwa,  and  Fukutoku  dropped  out  of the  sample  in September  1998. In March 1999, Long-term  Credit  Bank,  Nippon 
Credit Bank, Kokumin,  Koufuku,  and Tokyo  Sowa  were  eliminated  from the  coverage.  As  a result  of these  changes,  the sample  for March 1999 covers  17 
major banks (9 city banks,  7 trust banks,  and 1 long-term  credit bank),  as well  as 121 other banks  (64 regional  and 57 second-tier  regional  banks) for a total of 
138 banks. 
aCumulative direct write-offs  (which  include  losses  on sales  of loans  to other entities  such  as the CCPC and losses  on support  to other financial  institutions) 
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In March 1998, the definition  of bad loans  was  once  again expanded. 
The new  definition,  which  remains in place at this writing,  identifies  bad 
loans  (now  called  "risk management  credits")  as loans  to failed  enter- 
prises,  loans  whose  interest  payments  have  been  suspended  for  3 
months  or more,  and  loans  with  concessions  (which  cover  loans  with 
reduced  interest  rates and loans  to corporations  under  reorganization). 
This expansion  of the definition  and the deterioration  in the economy  in 
1997 sharply  increased  the  stock of bad loans.  Thus,  as of March 1999, 
despite  continued  write-offs  and  removal  of  many  banks  which  failed 
over  the  last  couple  of years,  the  official amount  of bad  loans  for the 
major banks  (all banks) stood  at ?20  trillion (?30 trillion).36 Overall,  the 
bad-loan  numbers  quoted  on the bank financial statements  still tend  to 
be  low,  since  the  banks  need  not  identify  loans  to  firms  that  are in 
trouble  but where  no  restructuring  or missed  payments  have  yet been 
recorded. 
4.2 ESTIMATES  BASED  ON SUPERVISORY  GUIDELINES 
For supervisory  purposes,  the regulators have always been aware of this 
problem  so  the  Bank of  Japan and  Ministry  of  Finance  [and now  the 
Financial Supervisory  Authority  (FSA)] have focused  on the chances that 
a loan will be collected.  This means  that both  the condition  of the bor- 
rower and the quality of collateral are relevant.  Accordingly,  loans to the 
same borrower  can be classified  into  different  categories  if they  are se- 
cured by different collateral and hence  offer different expected  levels  of 
repayment.  The coverage  of assets  which  are considered  is also slightly 
broader  than  the  voluntarily  disclosed  data,  since  this  assessment  in- 
cludes  loanlike  items  such  as  securities  loaned  in  addition  to conven- 
tional loans. 
Under  this  scheme,  which  is also  used  by U.S.  regulators,  loans  are 
classified  into  four  categories.  Category  4  includes  the  loans  that  are 
noncollectable  or  of  no  value.  These  are  the  unsecured  portions  of 
loans  made  to  failed  firms.  Category  3  is  the  set  of  loans  that  are 
seriously  doubtful  with  regard  to  their  ultimate  collection.  These  in- 
clude  loans  to  bankrupt  (or nearly  bankrupt)  companies  that  are  se- 
cured,  but where  the market value  of collateral is well  below  the book 
value.  In practice  these  loans  are expected  to  return  little  or nothing, 
unless  the  value  of  the  collateral  increases  dramatically.  The  FSA de- 
scribes  Category  2  loans  as  "credits  subject  to  specific  risk  manage- 
ment."  These  loans  are  not  yet  judged  to  be  uncollectible  but  are 
36. See the footnotes  to Table 14 for a complete  list of when  various  banks were  dropped 
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deemed  to require attention;  the popular  press  sometimes  refers to the 
Category  2  loans  as  being  in  the  "gray zone."  Category  2  loans  are 
sometimes  further  classified  to  separate  those  loans  that require  "spe- 
cial attention"  from the  others.  For example,  the  Financial Reconstruc- 
tion  Commission's  guideline  on  provisioning  for nonperforming  loans 
suggests  two  different  provisioning  ratios for these  two  subcategories. 
Finally, Category  1 covers  the remaining  loans  whose  repayment  is not 
supposed  to be in any doubt. 
Because  of the  large  number  of Category  2 loans  (which  are mostly 
excluded  from  the  numbers  shown  on  the  bank  financial  statements), 
this  classification  scheme  generally  produces  much  larger estimates  of 
problem  loans.  In  1998,  the  government  started  to  publish  aggregate 
statistics  on  loans  sorted  according  to  these  criteria.  The  banks'  own 
assessments  are reported  in the top panel of Table 15. In December  1998 
the  FSA released  its  own  estimates  for the  major banks  (as  of March 
1998, based on their 1998 on-site examinations).  These figures are shown 
in the  bottom  panel  of the  table.  The FSA data suggest  that the  major 
banks in Japan had ?57.4  trillion of bad loans (or 14% of total loans) as of 
March of 1998. 
Converting  these  figures  into  the  expected  cost  of  cleaning  up  the 
bank balance  sheets  requires  two  more  assumptions.  First, one  has  to 
decide  whether  the supervisors  have correctly identified  all the problem 
loans  at the banks.  It is generally  agreed  that the banks'  self-reporting 
has  been  fairly  optimistic.  For  example,  when  Nippon  Credit  Bank 
(NCB) was nationalized,  the FSA announced  that it had problem loans of 
more than ?3.7  trillion; NCB's own  assessment  put the losses  at roughly 
?3.2  trillion. The same kind of underreporting  was uncovered  when  the 
Long-Term  Credit  Bank (LTCB) was  nationalized.  Comparing  the  top 
and  bottom  panels  in  Table  15 shows  that  the  FSA believed  that  the 
major banks  had  failed  to identify  roughly  ?7  trillion of risky loans.  In 
April 1999, the FSA issued  new  guidelines  that included  detailed instruc- 
tions on how  to classify  loans. 
A second  problem  is determining  the  fraction of the Category  2 and 
Category 3 loans that will ultimately be lost. A study by the Supervision 
Department  of the  Bank of Japan (1997) found  that 17% of Category  2 
loans  and 75% of Category  3 loans  identified  in 1993 became  uncollect- 
able within  three years. Although  the sample  size used  in the BOJ study 
was  very  small,  the numbers  provide  an upper  bound  on the recovery 
rates for Category 2 and Category 3 of 83% and 25% respectively.  Assum- 
ing that the Category 4 loans are worthless,  but that Category 2 loans do 
return ?83  against every ?100  is owed  and that Category  3 loans return 
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Table 15  DISTRIBUTION  OF LOANS  BY  SUPERVISORY  CLASSIFICATION 
Banks'  1998  Self-Reported  Dataa 
Loans (billion  yen) 
Sample  Date  Category  1  2  3  4  Total Loans 
Major  banks  Mar. 1998  371,607  45,157  4,808  125  421,697 
All banks  Mar. 1998  544,814  65,488  6,065  130  616,495 
Major  banks  Sept. 1998  354,629  45,537  5,697  77  405,940 
All banks  Sept. 1998  524,980  66,078  6,863  86  598,007 
March  1998  Data for 19 Major  Banks  as Determined  by FSA  Auditsb 
Loans (billion  yen) 
Category  1  2  3  4  Total Loans 
364,332  48,971  7,756  637  421,696 
There are four loan categories used by bank supervisors. Category 4 includes the loans that are 
noncollectable  or of no value. Category  3 is the set of loans that are seriously  doubtful  with regard  to 
their  ultimate  collection.  In practice  these loans are  also expected  to return  nothing. Category  2 loans  are 
"credits  subject  to specific  management  risk."  These  loans are  not yet judged to be uncollectable  but are 
deemed to require  special attention.  Category  1 covers the remaining  loans, whose repayment  is not 
supposed to be in any doubt. (See text for further  details.) 
aSource:  Financial  Supervisory  Agency, "The  status of risk  management  loans held by all banks  in Japan 
(as of the end of September,  1998),"  press release,  January  22, 1999.  The figures  include  loans of Long- 
Term  Credit  Bank  and Nippon Credit  Bank,  but exclude those of Hokkaido  Takushoku  Bank,  Tokuyo 
City Bank,  Kyoto  Kyoei  Bank,  Naniwa Bank,  Fukutoku  Bank,  and Midori  Bank. 
bSource:  Financial  Supervisory  Agency Web site (www.fsa.go.jp), published in December  1998. Note 
that these figures  include loans of the Long  Term  Credit  Bank  and Nippon Credit  Bank. 
amounts  to ?14.78  trillion  (which  is about 3% of GDP or 3.5% of total 
loans). 
Some  private-sector  analysts  find this calculation  very  optimistic,  be- 
cause  the calculation  is based  on the amount  of problem  loans reported 
by banks  and FSA, and  the  figures  in BOJ study  overestimate  the  true 
recovery  rates for problem  loans.  For example,  Ohara (1998) estimates 
that the amount  of bad loans at the major banks to be ?73.4  trillion as of 
March  1998.  Assuming  a 25% recovery  rate for the  risk management 
loans and 62.5% recovery rate for the remaining bad loans,  she arrives at 
?35  trillion (7% of GDP) as the estimated  loss.  Fiorillo (1999) estimated, 
as  of  February  1999,  the  size  of  loans  for  the  major banks  that  will 
eventually  be uncollectable  to be ?38  trillion,  or 7.6% of GDP.37 These 
estimates  suggest  (plausibly  to us) that many more loans will have to be 
written  off than have been  disposed  of so far. 
37. Private-sector  analysts  also point  out  that there are probably  large losses  in financial 
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4.3 ESTIMATES  BASED  ON THE  DISCLOSURES  MANDATED  BY 
THE  FINANCIAL  RECONSTRUCTION  ACT 
Since  April  1999 another  set  of bad-loan  estimates  have  been  floating 
around. Section 7 of the Financial Reconstruction Act (FRA) requires each 
bank  to  report bad  loans  (as described  below)  to  the  Financial  Recon- 
struction  Commission  and to publish  the  data. Unfortunately,  the FRA 
definition  of  bad  loans  falls  in  between  the  two  previously  described 
definitions.  In particular, the FRA highlights  loans  to failed enterprises 
and de facto failed enterprises,  loans to near-bankrupt  companies,  loans 
whose  interest  payments  have  been  suspended  for  more  than  three 
months,  and loans with concessions.  Essentially  this means that the FRA 
definition  includes  the Category 3 and 4 loans according to the supervis- 
ory definition,  but not all of the Category 2 loans.  Instead the FRA defini- 
tion focuses  only  on any remaining  loans  that would  be counted  in the 
banks' voluntarily  disclosed  data. 
Given  this  reporting  convention,  the  FRA estimates  should  be  ex- 
pected  to lie in between  the two prior sets of estimates.  In the first round 
of  disclosure,  which  covered  the  conditions  as  of  March  1999,  the 
amount  of bad loans at all banks was ?34 trillion. Based on data from the 
web  sites  of  the  FSA and  FRC, this  was  about  ?4  trillion  larger than 
voluntarily  disclosed  data, but far lower  than the ?64  trillion estimated 
by the  supervisors.  This is about  ?6  trillion larger than  the voluntarily 
disclosed  data, but far below  the  supervisory  estimates  (Fiorillo, 1999). 
For a further discussion  of how  the various sets of estimates  compare see 
Iwahara, Okina,  Kanemoto,  and Narisawa  (1999). 
Overall, we conclude  that there are three key considerations  that must 
be kept in mind when  evaluating  different estimates of the size of the bad- 
loan problem.  First, and most  importantly,  one must check whether  the 
data are based  on assessments  of the collectability  of loans  or are taken 
from the bank financial statements.  Second  assuming  that most  people 
will  want  the  collection-based  estimates,  it  is  necessary  to  determine 
whether  the  data have  been  self-reported  by the banks  or are based  on 
supervisors'  (or private-sector  analysts')  estimates.  Finally, it is impera- 
tive  to be  clear about  what  assumptions  are being  used  regarding  the 
fraction of the gray-zone  loans that will be collected. 
To help  put  the Japanese bad loans  problem  in perspective,  Table 16 
shows  the  size  of banking  crises  in other developed  countries  over the 
last two decades  (see Corbett, 1999b, for a more comprehensive  compari- 
son).  Clearly the  Japanese  crisis  is much  larger than  the  U.S.  savings- 
and-loan  crisis, and thus  a full bailout would  require significantly  more 
resources  than were deployed  in the U.S. rescue.  Discussions  of what to Table 16  REVIEW OF SELECTED  COUNTRIES' BANKING PROBLEMS, 
1980-1996 
Non- 
performing  Fiscal 
Country  Period  Loansa  Costb  Comments 
Argentina  1980-1982 
1989-1990 
1995 
Australia  1989-1992 
Chile  1981-1987 
9%  4% 
27%  N/A  37% of state-owned  banks 
were  nonperforming. 
Failed banks held 40% of 
financial system  assets. 
N/A  N/A  45 of 205 institutions  were 
closed  or merged. 
6%  1.90% 
16%  19%  8 banks intervened  in 1981 
(33% of outstanding 
loans,  11 in 1982-1983 
(45% of outstanding 
loans). 
Colombia 






























































Liquidity crisis in 1991. 
Nonperforming  loans con- 
centrated in state-owned 
banks. 
Loans loss equivalent  to 
1.4% of GDP. 
Banking system  national- 
ized. 
1142 S&L institutions  and 
1395 banks were  closed. 
59%  31% 
N/A  17% 
Sources:  IMF (1998c) and Lindgren,  Garcia, and Saal (1996). 
aEstimated at peak of the crisis, as percentage  of total loans. 
bEstmated as percentage  of annual GDP during  the restructuring  period. 182 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
do about a bailout are further clouded  by the fact that the government  is 
already running  a large deficit (estimated  to be more than 6% of GDP by 
the IMF, 1998b). On top of this, Japan faces a significant upcoming  social 
security  problem.  This  has  led  the  government  to  try  to  rein  in  the 
deficits.  For instance,  the Fiscal Structural Reform Act passed  in Novem- 
ber 1997 required the government  to bring the deficit below  3% of GDP 
by fiscal year 2003. The weakness  of the economy  led the government  to 
first push  back the  goal by two  years in May 1998 and  then  eventually 
suspend  the Act completely  in December  1998. There is still strong senti- 
ment,  however,  within  the  government  for trying  to begin  cutting  the 
deficit as soon  as possible. 
We draw  two  conclusions  from this  assessment.  First, the  fiscal con- 
cerns suggest  it is important to focus on the amount  of funds that would 
be needed  to keep  a large enough  banking  sector in place  to serve bor- 
rowers  once  the  crisis is over  and  the  deregulation  has  taken hold.  By 
looking  ahead,  one can try to determine  the minimum  amount of public 
money  that  will  be  needed.  We can  then  compare  the  minimum  esti- 
mates with  the various  proposals  that have been  made. 
Second,  in assessing  the  options  that the  banks  have  in developing 
new  strategies  it is important  to allow  for their weak  capital positions. 
The flip side of the problems  documented  in Tables 14 and 15 is that the 
Japanese  banks  have  very  low  levels  of  capital  and  are likely  to  have 
trouble raising much money  in the capital markets in the short run. For 
instance,  Moody's  rating agency  gives  most of the major Japanese banks 
a financial  strength  rating of E or E+  (the two  lowest  ratings  on  their 
scale).  Such banks  are expected  to  "require periodic  outside  support." 
As  a consequence  the  banks  are unlikely  to be  able  to purchase  other 
large firms in order to acquire expertise.  Similarly, bankruptcy seems  like 
a real risk that would  become  more imminent  if they were  to undertake 
any  large  investments  that  have  long  payback  periods.  With  this  in 
mind,  we  sketch  one  scenario  for the  future  of  the  Japanese  banking 
sector. 
5.  Quantifying  the  Impending  Shrinkage  of the  Japanese 
Banking  Sector 
The evidence  presented  in Section 3 suggests  that large Japanese manufac- 
turing companies  have already almost reduced their reliance on banks to 
about the level of bank dependence  observed  in the United States. If our 
conjecture that other firms will soon be following  this lead is correct, it is 
natural to ask what that might imply for the future of Japanese banks. The 
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5.1 MAINTAINED  ASSUMPTIONS  AND CAVEATS 
Before  diving  into  the  calculation  it  is  important  to  recognize  several 
caveats  about the exercise.  First, our approach  should  be thought  of as 
only  calibrating  the  eventual  size  of  a possible  reduction  in  loan  de- 
mand.  We will  explore  several  different  assumptions  about  potential 
shifts,  but  all of  our scenarios  will  take years  to play  out,  so  that  the 
numbers  that follow  can at best be thought  of as medium-run  forecasts. 
We discuss  the timing  issues  further in the next section. 
Second,  we  are implicitly  assuming  that loan  demand  will  drive the 
size  of banks.  Although  we believe  this is the most  reasonable  assump- 
tion to make,  it could  fail for a variety of reasons.  For instance,  deposi- 
tors may continue  to stuff their money  into the banks even  after all the 
Big Bang reforms  are complete.  For the most  part we  have  also ignored 
the  presence  of  the  huge  Japanese  postal  savings  system  (PSS).  But 
there  is  a  continuing  debate  about  whether  the  PSS  should  be  re- 
formed.  It is easy  to imagine  PSS reforms  that wind  up pushing  large 
savings  flows back towards  the banks.  We will briefly discuss  the plausi- 
bility of the size  of the implied  adjustment  in deposits  after we  present 
our findings. 
Another  risk of basing  our forecasts on loan demand  is the possibility 
that the banks could  shed  loans  but pick up enough  new  lines  of busi- 
ness  so  that they  would  not  have  to shrink.38 Given  that the Japanese 
banks currently have  very little expertise  outside  of traditional banking 
and  limited  capital to buy  such  expertise,  this  scenario  may  seem  un- 
likely  right now.  However,  if some  of these  banks  end  up being  sold  to 
foreign  financial services  firms, it becomes  much more realistic. In view 
of the rapidly changing  competitive  landscape  of the Japanese financial 
services  industry, we view  this as a genuine  possibility. 
A third complication  is  that,  because  we  focus  on  the bank  debt-to- 
asset ratio, one must take a stand on what will happen  to the growth  of 
corporate assets in order to draw any conclusions  about the level of bank 
lending.  Put differently, if corporate assets are growing,  then forecasts of 
a declining  bank debt-to-asset  ratio need  not imply that the level of bank 
loans  will  fall.  However,  there  are  several  pieces  of  evidence  which 
suggest  that an assumption  of zero growth of corporate assets is a reason- 
able forecast for Japanese firms over the medium  run. 
One  consideration  is the recent evidence  on asset  growth.  The Hojin 
Kigyo Tokei data suggest  that total assets  for all industries  grew  only  at 
1.7% a year from 1993 to 1998. Since new  firms are added  to the survey 
38. There are also factors that push  in the other direction.  For instance,  these  calculations 
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each year, the number in fact overstates  the true growth rate of corporate 
assets.  If this trend were  to continue,  then  asset  growth  would  be suffi- 
ciently low not to matter much for our purposes. 
Another  factor, which  has  been  emphasized  by  the Japan Economic 
Research  Center  (1997),  is  that  Japanese  corporations  are expected  to 
begin  reducing  their financial assets  (especially  low-return  liquid assets) 
as  their  financial  management  skills  improve.  The  dwindling  of  the 
banks'  practice  of  requiring  compensating  balances,  together  with  the 
winding  down  of cross-shareholdings,  will further contribute  to the re- 
duction  of financial assets.  Thus,  even  if a business-cycle  recovery leads 
Japanese  corporations  to  start  increasing  their  fixed  assets,  declining 
financial  assets  will  be  a significant  offsetting  factor. For these  reasons 
we  believe  that a reasonable  benchmark  is to translate any forecast  de- 
clines  in the bank  debt-to-asset  ratio into  one-for-one  declines  in bank 
lending. 
Finally, we also recognize  that this whole  exercise ignores the potential 
general  equilibrium  feedbacks  that  could  occur  with  large  changes  in 
intermediation.  Partly this is out of necessity,  since building  a full model 
of the financial sector is not yet possible.  However,  this strategy can be 
partially justified if we maintain that the economic  role of banks is tied to 
loan  generation,  particularly  to  smaller  firms,  and  that for most  other 
activities  banks  are redundant.  Under  this  view,  if the  banks  were  to 
hold  onto  customers  that might  otherwise  go to the capital market,  the 
banks would  have  to match the capital-market  rates. As these  rates are 
increasingly  determined  by global forces, our assumption  does  not seem 
very unreasonable. 
Keeping in mind all these caveats, we now explore what would  happen 
if all Japanese corporations  followed  the lead of the large manufacturing 
firms that have already moved  towards U.S. levels of bank dependence.39 
Since we  want  to consider  several  scenarios,  we  start by describing  and 
defending  the two basic assumptions  that are common  to all projections. 
After discussing  these premises we outline the different scenarios that we 
consider. 
The first key assumption  is that loan demand  for large and small firms 
can be aggregated  within  sectors.  Thus, for each sector we treat all large 
firms and all small firms identically. We do not necessarily treat large firms 
and small firms symmetrically within or across sectors. Our main justifica- 
tion  for this  approach  is the  evidence  in Table 6 regarding  the  relative 
stability of the bank borrowing  patterns exhibited by the U.S.  firms. 
Our second  key  assumption  involves  the choice  of sectors  to be ana- 
39. The whole  exercise is very much in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales  (1998). The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  *  185 
lyzed.  The only  really reliable data that we  have  for the  United  States 
pertain to manufacturing.  We also have some information  for large firms 
in  the  wholesale  and  retail  trade  sectors.  In all of  our  projections  we 
model these three sectors separately, in some cases making finer assump- 
tions  about  what  is  happening  within  manufacturing.  Unfortunately, 
this  means  that we  have  no  U.S.  data to guide  us for other industries. 
For this reason  we  aggregate  the remaining  Japanese industries  into an 
"other" category. 
5.2 IMPLICATIONS  OF U.S. BORROWING  PATTERNS  FOR 
JAPANESE  LOAN DEMAND 
There are three basic inputs  into  the  forecasts  that we  report. The first 
piece  of  information  is  the  1998 total  amounts  of  borrowing  done  by 
large and  small  firms across our four sectors  of the Japanese economy. 
These  numbers  come  from  the  Hojin Kigyo Tokei, and  we  follow  the 
convention  from Table 4 of defining  large firms to have  a book value  of 
capital  above  ?1  billion.  The second  element  in the  calculation  are the 
initial observed  levels  of bank dependence  for the large and small firms 
in the  different  sectors.  These  numbers  can also be  computed  directly 
using  the unpublished  data we  obtained. 
Table 17 shows  the 1998 distribution of bank borrowing and bank depen- 
dence for Japanese firms. Table 4 has already shown  the noticeable  differ- 
ences  in large-and small-firm bank dependence  across sectors.  We draw 
three further conclusions  from Table 17. First, the "other" category covers 
over half of the bank borrowing  done  by firms in the sample.  Since we 
have  no  representative  data  for  these  firms  in  the  United  States,  this 
means  that a significant  portion  of our forecast will be based  purely  on 
imputations  for what might happen  to this large, unmodeled  segment  of 
borrowers. 
Second,  the table shows  that Japanese banks  are already serving  pri- 
marily small borrowers.  Adding  up loans made  to small firms across all 
four sectors reveals  that small borrowers  receive  about 64% of the bank 
credit tracked in the Hojin Kigyo Tokei.  One  check on  the plausibility  of 
our forecasts  will be to see  if they  imply  reasonable  splits  between  the 
aggregate  amount  of large- and small-firm borrowing. 
Lastly, the table also indirectly  shows  the comprehensive  coverage  of 
the  Hojin Kigyo Tokei. According  to  balance-sheet  information  for  all 
banks,  total lending  should  be about ?450 trillion as of March 1998.40  The 
40. This figure excludes  overdrafts.  We believe  that excluding  overdrafts  makes sense  be- 
cause such commitment  lending  is unlikely to be affected by the Big Bang. See Kashyap, 
Rajan, and Stein (1999) for theoretical support for this argument and empirical evidence 
showing  that even  in the U.S.  the commitment  business  is dominated  by banks. 186 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
Table  17  DISTRIBUTION  OF THE  1998  QUANTITY  OF BANK 
BORROWING  AND THE  RATIO  OF BANK  DEBT  TO ASSETS  FOR 
JAPANESE  FIRMS 
Total  Bank  Fraction  of 
Borrowing  Category 
(trillion  Ratio  of Bank  Borrowing  by 
Samplea  yen)  Debt  to Assets  Small  Firms 
All firms, all industries  445  0.3567  0.6432 
Large  firms, all industries  159  0.2761 
Small firms, all industries  286  0.4257 
All firms, manufacturing  92  0.2372  0.5738 
Large  firms, manufacturing  39  0.1647 
Small firms, manufacturing  53  0.3527 
All firms, wholesale trade  65  0.3392  0.7160 
Large  firms, wholesale trade  19  0.3027 
Small firms, wholesale trade  46  0.3562 
All firms, retail  trade  41  0.4110  0.8193 
Large  firms, retail trade  7  0.2559 
Small firms, retail  trade  34  0.4746 
All firms, other industriesb  247  0.4348  0.6207 
Large  firms, other industries  94  0.3796 
Small firms, other industries  153  0.4773 
Source:  Ministry of Finance,  Hojin Kigyo Tokei. 
aLarge firms are those  that have book value  of equity greater than ?1 billion. 
bAll those  which  are not in manufacturing,  wholesale  trade, or retail trade. 
coverage  in our sample  is ?445  trillion. The close  match actually  masks 
two  differences.  One  is that the survey  includes  borrowing  from finan- 
cial institutions  such  as  credit  unions  that  are not  counted  as  banks. 
However,  the  survey  also excludes  borrowing  done  by truly tiny  firms 
and individuals.  It appears these  two differences  largely cancel. 
The final ingredient  needed  for our forecasts  is the  assumed  level  of 
bank  dependence  that  will  prevail  in  the  new  steady  state.  Wherever 
possible  we  try to  pin  down  these  figures  using  the  U.S.  experience. 
Based  on  the  QFR data from Table 6, we  can get benchmarks  for large 
and  small  manufacturing  firms,  large  retail firms,  and  large wholesale 
firms. In fact, for the manufacturing  sector we can do better and get two- 
digit-level  data for the 14 industries.  However,  we have no solid data for 
the borrowing  by U.S.  firms in the  "other" industries  and therefore try 
several  very  different  ways  of  calibrating  the  changes  for these  firms. 
Since  each  hypothesized  steady  state  requires  eight  assumptions 
about the bank debt-to-asset  ratios (two  types  of firms in four sectors), 
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focus  on  three  different  variations  that  we  believe  should  bound  the 
implied  adjustments.  Each  of  these  variations  amounts  to  setting  a 
switch  that pins down  two or more of the eight bank debt-to-asset  ratios. 
The  first set  of  alternatives  involve  differing  assumptions  about  the 
behavior  of Japanese manufacturing  firms.  Our simplest  assumption  is 
that the large and the small firms' bank dependence  in Japan converge  to 
the same  levels  that hold  for the typical large and small manufacturing 
firms in the  U.S.  We call this  case  the  simple manufacturing assumption. 
This  assumption  ignores  the  differences  in  industrial  composition  be- 
tween  the two countries.  Therefore, we repeat the calculations assuming 
instead  that large and small Japanese firms' bank dependence  converge 
on  an industry-by-industry  basis  to the U.S.  levels.  Here we  have  data 
for  14 industries  (shown  in  Tables 7 and  8),  and  we  form  a fifteenth 
category  for the remaining  firms. Although  we  conduct  the calculations 
at the  industry  level,  the  results  are aggregated  back to the  total man- 
ufacturing  level  for reporting  purposes.  We denote  this  second  case  as 
the industry-adjusted  manufacturing  assumption. 
A second  pair of assumptions  relate to the treatment of small firms in 
the wholesale  and retail sectors.  Although  the QFR gives  us some  data 
on U.S. borrowing  propensities  for large firms, there are no QFR data for 
small  firms in  these  sectors.  The  only  available  data that we  know  of 
describing  small-firm  borrowing  patterns  in  the  U.S.  are in  the  1993 
National  Survey  of Small Business  Finances  (NSSBF). This survey,  con- 
ducted  for the  Board of Governors  of the  Federal Reserve  System  and 
the U.S.  Small Business  Administration,  covers  a nationally  representa- 
tive sample  of very small businesses.41 
Petersen  and  Rajan (1994) have  analyzed  these  data  and  were  kind 
enough  to provide  us with  some  simple  tabulations  of the ratio of bank 
debt  to  assets  for  these  firms.  These  tabulations  suggest  that  for  the 
NSSBF  the  total  debt  ratio was  between  0.18  and  0.24  for the  sector 
groupings  that we  are analyzing  (on an asset-weighted  basis).  We also 
learned  that banks  supply  about half  of all loans  to these  firms.  How- 
ever,  there are two  factors that make  us hesitant  to rely completely  on 
these  numbers  in our simulations.  One  concern  is that the firms in the 
NSSBF are very small. For instance,  the top decile of firms in this sample 
includes  firms with  as little as $2.3 million  in assets.  The "small" Japa- 
nese  firms that we  are studying  appear to be about ten times bigger  in 
terms of average assets. 
41. The target  population is all for-profit,  nonfinancial,  nonfarm  business enterprises  that 
had fewer than 500 employees and were in operation  as of year-end 1992.  The public 
data set contains 4637 firms and describes all the loans each firm has as of year-end 
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Secondly,  we  know  that  bank  borrowing  becomes  more  important 
once  firms grow. For instance,  within  the NSSBF sample,  both  the frac- 
tion of firms with  any debt and the fraction of firms' debt owed  to banks 
rise with  firm size.  Thus,  we  suspect  that U.S.  firms which  would  be 
comparable in size to our sample of Japanese firms would  be more bank- 
dependent  in their financing  than are the NSSBF firms. Nevertheless,  it 
seems  to us unlikely  that this growth  effect would  be strong enough  to 
push  the firms' bank-debt-to-asset  ratio much beyond  the 35% (which  is 
the upper end of the range for the total debt-to-asset  ratio in the NSSBF). 
With these numbers  as a reference we consider two different scenarios 
for the small trade firms. The first approach plays  off of the small-firm- 
to-large-firm borrowing  ratio that is observed  in U.S. manufacturing.  We 
apply  this ratio to the level  of the QFR for large firms in each sector to 
get a target level  of small firms in each sector. We describe this assump- 
tion as identifying  small trade firms' bank dependence  using U.S. manu- 
facturing data. Given  the data in Table 6, we  can see that this will imply 
bank-debt-to-asset  ratios  of  about  0.23  and  0.32  for  small  retail  and 
wholesale  firms respectively. 
Are these numbers  reasonable? In the NSSBF sample they are 0.24 and 
0.20,  respectively.  Using  the figures  from Table 6, this suggests  that the 
ratio of  the  NSSBF levels  of bank  dependence  to  the  levels  found  for 
large retailers and wholesalers  is in line with  the  approximate  2:1 ratio 
found  in U.S.  manufacturing.  Thus,  we  believe  that unless  the NSSBF 
data  significantly  understate  small  firms' bank  dependence,  assuming 
the small and large firms' differences  are about the same (in ratio terms) 
across sectors  seems  plausible. 
Our second  approach exploits  the fact that we  can observe both small 
and large firms' borrowing  patterns  for the Japanese trade firms. In this 
case  we  get  the  steady-state  target  level  of  small-firm  borrowing  for 
wholesalers  by  multiplying  the  ratio  of  small-firm  to  large-firm  bank 
dependence  of wholesalers  in Japan by the level of bank dependence  for 
large U.S. wholesalers.  In essence  this assumes  that both large and small 
Japanese wholesalers  will adjust by the same percentage.  We carry out the 
same calculations  for retailers, and describe this assumption  as identify- 
ing small trade firms' bank dependence  using  existing Japanese borrow- 
ing patterns.  Using  these  assumptions,  the target levels  of bank depen- 
dence  are 0.20 and 0.18 for small retail and wholesale  firms respectively. 
These targets are both below  the levels  found  in the NSSBF and thus are 
likely to lead us to overstate  the decline  in bank dependence. 
Our  third  and  last  set  of  cases  involve  the  assumptions  about  the 
levels  of bank  dependence  for the  other  industries  such  as transporta- 
tion,  communications,  services,  and construction,  where  we  have  abso- The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  ?  189 
lutely  no  QFR data. Based  on the Japanese  data shown  in Table 17, we 
can see  that as of  1998 these  firms are more bank-dependent  than  the 
wholesale  and retail firms. However,  these  firms also have more of their 
bank  borrowing  being  done  by  large  firms  than  is  the  case  for either 
wholesalers  or retailers. Considering  both these factors, we use the aver- 
age  proportional  adjustment  done  by  the  wholesale  and  retail  trade 
firms to come  up with  the required  adjustment  for the large and small 
firms in the other category. More specifically, we assume  that the ratio of 
the target level  to the current level  of bank dependence  for large (small) 
"other" firms is equal  to the  weighted  average  of the  target-to-current 
ratio for large  (small) firms in wholesale  and  retail trade industries.  In 
the  NSSBF data the  level of bank  dependence  for other  sector  firms is 
close  to  the  level  of bank  dependence  for trade firms.  Thus,  for small 
firms  this  assumption  (which  does  not  force  the  levels  to  converge) 
seems  conservative. 
Given  the  amount  of  guesswork  involved  constructing  this  bench- 
mark, we consider  a second  refinement  in which  we assume  these  other 
firms only  adjust half  as much  as the  similar-sized  average  trade firm. 
We describe  this refinement  as halfway convergence  to distinguish  it from 
the  first case  above,  which  is  called full  convergence. Halfway  conver- 
gence is an attempt to trade off our ignorance  about how  the large firms 
in this  sector  are financed  against  the presumption  that capital-market 
financing  is likely to displace  at least some bank lending. 
We summarize  the pairs of alternatives and introduce some  shorthand 
notation  for describing  them in Table 18. Since the three alternatives  are 
mutually  exclusive,  we have  eight total cases to consider.  By comparing 
the scenarios where  two of the three factors are held constant,  we will be 
able  to  take  "derivatives"  to  determine  which  of  the  convergence  as- 
sumptions  are most  powerful.  Below,  as  a sensitivity  check,  we  also 
explore what happens  if we  do not assume  that the large Japanese firms 
in  wholesale  and  retail trade  go  all the  way  to  the  levels  seen  in  the 
United  States. 
Table 19 compares  the  eight  alternative  steady  states  for future  loan 
demand  with  the  current  levels  of  borrowing  by  Japanese  firms.  We 
draw five main conclusions  from the calculations.  First and most impor- 
tantly,  under  all the  scenarios  we  explore,  the U.S.  benchmark  implies a 
large impending decline in loan demand by Japanese  firms. The smallest  hy- 
pothesized  contraction suggests  a decline  of more than 25% in bank-loan 
demand.  Even recognizing  that these  calculations  refer to medium-term 
adjustments,  we find the implied  drops to be quite large. We discuss  the 
transitional  implications  of this kind  of shift in the  concluding  section. 
Second,  the forecasts  all seem  reasonable  in their implications  for the 190 *  HOSHI & KASHYAP 
Table 18  ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING LOAN DEMAND 
USED FOR CALCULATING STEADY LOAN AMOUNTS 
Sector(s)  Directly Affected  Shorthand  Name  Brief  Description 




Industry-adjusted  manu- 
facturing convergence 
Small trade firms' bor- 
rowing  based  on U.S. 
manufacturing 
Small trade firms' bor- 
rowing  based  on current 
Japanese patterns 
Other industries  Full convergence 
Halfway  convergence 
Large and small Japa- 
nese  manufacturing 
firms' bank dependence 
converges  to U.S.  levels. 
Within each of 15 manu- 
facturing industries, 
large and small Japanese 
firms' bank dependence 
converges  to the U.S. 
levels. 
The ratio of bank depen- 
dence between  U.S. 
large and small manufac- 
turing is imposed  to in- 
fer the target level of bor- 
rowing  for small trade 
firms. 
The existing  ratio of 
bank dependence  be- 
tween  large and small 
firms within  each sector 
is imposed  to infer the 
target level  of borrowing 
for small firms in each 
sector. 
Target levels  for these 
firms are set to deliver 
an equal percentage  ad- 
justment  in bank depen- 
dence  for similar-sized 
trade firms. 
Target levels  for these 
firms are set to deliver 
an equal percentage  ad- 
justment  in bank depen- 
dence  for similar-sized 
trade firms. 
Manufacturing The  Japanese  Banking Crisis * 191 
Table 19  IMPLIED REDUCTIONS IN LENDING FOR JAPANESE BANKS, 
ASSUMING U.S.  BORROWING PATTERNS 
Assumptionfor  Fraction 
Assumptionfor  Assumption  for  Target  Level  Implied  of Total 
Manufacturing  Target  of Small  in Other  Decrease  Lending  to 
Firms  Trade  Firms  Industries  in Lending  Small Firms 
Simple  Based on U.S.  Full  41.5%  70.6% 
convergence  manufacturing  convergence 
Half  29.8%  67.4% 
convergence 
Based on current  Full  52.4%  63.8% 
Japanese patterns  convergence 
Half  37.5%  63.4% 
convergence 
Industry-adjusted  Based on U.S.  Full  41.6%  71.3% 
convergence  manufacturing  convergence 
Half  29.9%  68.0% 
convergence 
Based on current  Full  52.5%  64.7% 
Japanese patterns  convergence 
Half  37.5%  64.1% 
convergence 
Calculations  assume  that  Japanese  firms'  borrowing  patterns  move towards  U.S. levels. Benchmarks  for 
the United States  are  taken  from  QFR  for the 2nd quarter  of 1998.  For  categories  where the QFR  data  are 
not sufficient,  the assumptions  shown in columns 2 and 3 are used. These assumptions  are described 
fully in the text and briefly  in Table  18. 
steady-state  customer  mix of the Japanese banks.  The various  scenarios 
all imply that small firms will account for between  62% and 72% of bank 
borrowing.  These  ranges  seem  to be plausible,  and since  this  ratio was 
calculated  endogenously,  we  find  this  to be  a reassuring  check  on  the 
methodology  and our assumptions. 
The other  three  conclusions  concern  which  of the  different  assump- 
tions appear to be quantitatively  important.  The different  treatment  for 
manufacturing  firms does  not appear to matter much.  Holding  constant 
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take account of interindustry  variation in manufacturing  borrowing  pat- 
terns  only  changes  the  implied  level  of borrowing  by about 0.1%. The 
implied  percentages  of aggregate  borrowing  by small  firms also  do not 
move  very much across these  two  assumptions. 
In contrast,  the  other two  assumptions  make  a big difference.  These 
two  assumptions  interact,  since  the target levels  assumed  for the small 
trade  firms also  help  determine  the  target level  of borrowing  by  small 
firms  in  the  other  category.  Whether  or not  the  "other" firms  adjust 
all the way  or just halfway  accounts  for at least an 11-percentage-point 
difference  in the  total  projected  level  of borrowing.  Similarly, the  two 
alternatives  for the  target levels  of borrowing  by small trade firms lead 
to an estimated  difference  of at least 7-percentage  points.  As predicted, 
the benchmark  based  on  the  patterns  in U.S.  manufacturing  produces 
smaller  declines.  Overall,  the  large  size  of  these  effects  suggests  that 
further work to narrow  the uncertainty  over which  assumptions  to rely 
upon  is needed. 
5.3 PLAUSIBILITY  CHECKS  FOR  THE  IMPLIED  SHRINKAGE  IN 
THE  JAPANESE  BANKING  SECTOR 
Given  the  large  magnitudes  of  the  projected  decline  in  lending,  one 
would  like to see  if there are other implications  of this forecast that can 
be  verified  or  alternative  assumptions  might  overturn  the  prediction. 
We briefly describe three plausibility  checks that we  have conducted. 
Our first test is to see  whether  the  sectoral  implications  for drops  in 
loan demand  are credible. Implicit in all the estimates  shown  in Table 19 
is  the  assumption  that  firms  in  the  trade  sector  fully  converge  to  the 
levels  of bank dependence  in the United  States.  Given the sizable  exist- 
ing  gaps  between  large  firms' bank  dependence  in  the  two  countries 
documented  in Tables 4 and 6, this is a fairly strong assumption.  Indeed, 
one  might  also  question  whether  it  is  prudent  to  forecast  that  bank 
dependence  among  small manufacturing  firms will converge. 
To address  these  concerns  we  conducted  another  set  of simulations 
that  presume  far less  convergence  than  is built  into  our baseline  sce- 
nario.  In these  simulations,  we  maintained  that only  large manufactur- 
ing  firms would  fully  converge  to the  same  level  of bank dependence. 
For all the  remaining  firms, Japanese  firms were  posited  to move  half- 
way  towards  the  level  of  bank  dependence  that  is  observed  in  the 
United  States.  We view  these  assumptions  as being  extremely  conserva- 
tive,  and  yet  they  still imply  reductions  in the bank-debt-to-asset  ratio 
between  22% and  29% (depending  on  which  of  the  various  assump- 
tions  are used  to  pin  down  the  target  levels  for  the  small  trade  and 
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From  Table 17 one  can  see  why  a reduction  of  at least  20% seems 
inevitable.  The key  observation  is that the  1998 borrowing  patterns  in 
Japan do  not  involve  much  bank  credit  going  to large  trade firms.  So 
varying  their bank  dependence  does  not  have  much  aggregate  effect. 
But about 42% of total bank lending  is going  to small firms in retail trade 
and  other  industries  which  have  very  high  bank-debt-to-asset  ratios. 
Even  modest  adjustments  by  these  firms,  combined  with  a continued 
decline  in bank borrowing  by the numerous  large manufacturing  firms, 
will generate  a large decline  in the bank-debt-to-asset  ratio. 
A second  plausibility  check involves  exploring  what  our forecast will 
imply  for depositors.  The  evidence  in  Section  3 suggested  that  in  the 
past Japanese individuals  have  not abandoned  the banks.  One  obvious 
question  is whether  our medium-term  forecast implies  incredible  shifts 
in the behavior  of depositors. 
Figure 9 shows  how  (as of June,  1998) Japanese households  allocated 
their ?1,200  trillion of financial assets.  As we pointed  out in Table 9, the 
Japanese households  historically have heavily  relied on deposits.  Figure 
9 indicates  that currently  59% of household  financial  assets  are in cash 
and  deposits  (including  postal  savings).  A  30% rate  of  shrinkage  for 
bank loans translates into ?133 trillion reduction (using 1998 2nd-quarter 
data from Quarterly  Report  of Incorporated  Enterprise  Statistics). If we  con- 
sider an extreme  case,  then  deposits  at these  institutions  also must  fall 
by 30%. This would  reduce the total amount of cash and deposits  (includ- 
ing postal  savings)  by  18%, and its proportion  in total financial wealth 
would  fall to 48%. In the  deposit-to-GDP  ratio we  would  also expect  a 
decline  of 18%, which  would  reduce the ratio to 1.69. 
Looking at Table 9, we note that a deposit-to-GDP  ratio of 1.69 would 
still  be  higher  than  what  is  found  in  any  of  the  other  industrialized 
countries  shown  in the table. The prediction  that the proportion  of cash 
and  deposits  in  the  household  financial  assets  will  decline  to  48% is 
also plausible-this  would  still leave  Japan with  more  deposits  relative 
to  wealth  than  other  G7 countries.  Similarly, the  Japan Economic  Re- 
search  Center  (JERC) (1997) forecast  that  the  proportion  of  cash  and 
deposits  in household  financial  assets  will  decline  to 45% by 2010 and 
to 35% by 2020. 
Their forecast is premised  on a massive  shift of household  assets from 
deposits  to investment  trusts, which  they see growing  from their current 
level  of 2.3% to 9.1% by 2010 and to 20% by 2020. In our scenario,  if we 
assume  all the decline  in household  deposits  is matched  by an increase 
in  investment  trusts,  then  we  would  expect  the  share  of  investment 
trusts to increase  to 13%. Thus,  our scenario  also implies  a huge  boom 
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Figure  9 JUNE  1998  DISTRIBUTION  OF HOUSEHOLDS'  SAVINGS  ACROSS 
DIFFERENT  INSTRUMENTS 
Total  wealth is ?1,239,710  billion. (Category  totals in billions of yen are 
shown in parentheses.) 
Other  Securities 
(90,206)  Cash 
7%  (43,117) 
Deposits  at 
(316,288)  ...........36%0 
26%0 
i  l  i  i.r  ...  ; 
Trusts  Accounts 
(71,816) 
Postal  Savings 
(244,775) 
20%/ 
Source:  Flow-of-funds  accounts. 
There  are  many  other  analysts  who  forecast  similar  gains  for  in- 
vestment  trusts.  For instance,  Naito  (1999)  argues  that  because  of  a 
1998 change  in  regulation,  investment  trusts  are  the  most  appealing 
financial product  for households.  The 1998 change  allowed  "company- 
based"  investment  trusts,  which  are closer  to U.S.  mutual  funds  than 
are  "contract-based"  investment  trusts,  which  have  existed  in  Japan 
throughout  the post-war  period.  Perhaps more importantly,  the change 
allowed  banks  and  insurance  companies  to  sell  investment  trusts  at 
their counters  starting in December  1998. According  to the Nihon  Keizai 
Shinbum  (November  12,  1999),  the  amount  of  investment  trusts  pur- 
chased  through  banks  and  insurance  companies  through  October  1999 
was  already  ?2.4  trillion.  The  total  amount  of  investment  trusts  out- The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  *  195 
standing  also had increased  to ?53  trillion.  Given  these  considerations, 
we  do  not  find  the  implications  of  forecasts  for bank  deposits  to  be 
implausible. 
Finally, we  ask whether  there are any methods  one  might  use  to esti- 
mate  the  future  size  of the banking  sector that do not  rely on assump- 
tions  about  loan  demand.  Moody's  (1999) offers  a prediction  based  on 
profitability.  It argues  that  a reasonable  benchmark  is  to  assume  that 
Japanese  banks  will  need  to have  the  same  ratio of tangible  equity  to 
assets  as is found  in other  countries.42 They  estimate  that as of March 
1999 Japanese banks have  a tangible-equity-to-asset  ratio of 4.2%, while 
large  U.S.  banks  have  a ratio  of  around  6.5%.  Assuming  that  equity 
issuance  is not  possible,  this  leads  Moody's  to forecast  a reduction  of 
over  ?100  trillion  in  risk-weighted  assets  to  reach  the  U.S.  level.43 As 
they  note,  in  the  short  run  this  can  be  done  partially  by  securitizing 
loans.  But ultimately  this seems  like another way to arrive at the conclu- 
sion that a large contraction in the sector is needed. 
An  alternative  prediction  is available  from a long-term  forecast pub- 
lished  by  the  Japan Economic  Research  Center  (1997). The JERC fore- 
casts the levels  of financial assets and liabilities for each sector identified 
by Bank of Japan flow-of-funds  statistics.  Although  they  do not  reveal 
detailed  assumptions  behind  their forecasts,  some  of their predictions 
are based  on  assumptions  very  similar to  ours.  For instance,  they  as- 
sume  the  Japanese  corporate  financing  patterns  will  move  toward  the 
U.S.  model.  Looking at their forecasts for the market values  of financial 
assets  and liabilities,  we  find that their prediction  implies  that the bank- 
debt-to-asset  ratio for the  corporate  sector  will  decline  from  0.4461  in 
1995 to 0.2395 by 2020. Since they  use  the market values,  the numbers 
are not  directly  comparable  to our numbers,  but  the  magnitude  of the 
decline  in the bank-debt  ratio (46% in 25 years)  is as large as what  our 
analysis  implies. 
Because  they  assume  rather high  rate of growth  in assets  (3.3% per 
year for 25 years), they forecast the level  of bank loans to rise from ?555 
trillion in 1995 to ?675  trillion in 2020 (0.76% growth  per year). Assum- 
ing  a more  reasonable  growth  rate for  assets,  their  prediction  would 
imply a reduction in the absolute level of loans. For example,  if the assets 
grew  only  at  1.5% per  year,  then  bank  loans  would  be  projected  to 
decline  to ?432  trillion by 2020, a 22% drop. 
42. The ratio they consider  is Tier 1 capital (as defined  by the Basle banking  accord) minus 
state capital minus  preferred securities,  divided  by risk-weighted  assets  (see Moody's, 
1999, p. 24 for details). 
43. Loans are roughly  ?450 trillion, so if the reduction were made entirely by cutting loans, 
this would  imply a 22.2% decline. 196 *  HOSHI  & KASHYAP 
6.  Conclusions 
We  have  argued  that  the  disequilibrium  created  by  the  gradual  and 
lopsided  deregulation  in the Japanese financial system  played  an impor- 
tant role  in the  current banking  crisis.  The  deregulation  allowed  large 
bank  customers  to  quickly  shift  from bank  financing  to capital-market 
funding.  Meanwhile,  the deregulation  did relatively  little for savers,  so 
banks continued  to attract deposits.  However,  the deregulation  of bank 
powers  also was  slow  and gradual. This meant that if the banks were  to 
keep  lending  they  would  need  to seek  out new  customers.  The banks 
did take on many  new  small  customers.  They  also expanded  their real 
estate  lending.  Ultimately  these bets proved  to be unprofitable. 
In support  of this story, we present  a variety of evidence.  One finding 
is that the  banks'  performance  was  worse  in the  1990s than  would  be 
predicted  just  on  the  basis  of  macroeconomic  conditions.  Similarly, 
across banks,  we  find  that the banks  that were  most  at risk for losing 
customers  to  the  capital  markets  performed  worse  than  others.  Both 
these  results  suggest  the importance  of the deregulation.  We also docu- 
ment  that large Japanese firms (particularly in manufacturing)  are now 
almost  as independent  of bank financing  as comparable U.S.  firms. 
We argue  that once  the  Big Bang financial  deregulation  is complete, 
even  the  relatively  small  firms  will  start  following  the  route  already 
taken by the large firms by cutting  their dependence  on bank loans.  By 
assuming  other firms' financing  patterns  will  also converge  to the U.S. 
patterns,  we  calculated  how  much  the  Japanese  banking  sector  must 
shrink  in  the  steady  state.  Uniformly,  the  scenarios  that we  examined 
imply  a massive  contraction  in the  size  of the traditional banking  busi- 
ness  in Japan. 
While there are many  reasons why  one might  quibble with the details 
of the calculations  in Table 19, we  think they  at least  provide  a reason- 
able benchmark.  To overturn  the  basic  thrust  of  the  calculations,  one 
must  argue  that the basic U.S.  benchmark  is inappropriate.  We believe 
we  have  made  a compelling  case that for the large firms the benchmark 
is reasonable.  For the small firms, we  concede  that there is much  more 
guesswork  involved.  But, even  if we take our most conservative  scenario 
where  full convergence  in bank  dependence  is only  assumed  for large 
manufacturing  firms and all remaining  firms move  halfway  toward  the 
U.S.  levels,  we  still end  up projecting  more  than a 20% decline  in loan 
demand.  This forecast is comparable  to the one  Moody's  (1999) arrived 
at by making  quite different assumptions. 
What would  a 20% decline  imply  for the configuration  of the banking 
sector? There are many possible ways that this could shake out. However, The  Japanese  Banking  Crisis  *  197 
given the current debate over how  much public money  should be used to 
prop up the banks,  one natural question  to ask is how  many weak banks 
would  have  to  completely  exit  to  eliminate  the  excess  capacity  in  the 
industry. To pursue  this, we took the ranking of 142 Japanese banks as of 
September  1998, put forward in the March 1999 issue  of Kin'yu Business, 
and calculated the share of loans for each bank.44  This allows us to exam- 
ine how many banks must exit so that the cumulative  shrinkage in loans is 
sufficient  to bring the system  to its new  steady  state. 
We find that a 20% reduction  in lending  requires a complete  exit of the 
lowest-rated  45 banks of a total of 142 banks.  These  include  Long-Term 
Credit Bank (LTCB)  and Nippon  Credit Bank (NCB), which  were nation- 
alized in late 1998, and the regional banks that were put into receivership 
in the  first half of 1999. Perhaps more  importantly,  this set of 45 banks 
would  include  3 of the  15 major banks  (Daiwa,  Tokai, and Chuo  Trust) 
that received  a government  capital injection  in March 1999. If we  con- 
sider  a 30% shrinkage,  which  is  closer  to  the  average  of  the  Table 19 
estimates,  the number  of weak banks that would  have  to be eliminated 
jumps  to 69, including  three more (Yokohama, Asahi,  and Toyo Trust) of 
the  15 banks  which  received  government  money.  Even if the  relatively 
healthy  banks  can somehow  be convinced  to cut back on some  of their 
lending,  it is hard to escape  the conclusion  that any transition looks like 
it will involve  the exit of a number of major banks. 
Because  any assessment  of banks'  health  is somewhat  subjective,  we 
also looked  at the Moody's  Investor  Service  (1999) rankings.  They esti- 
mate the  "financial strength" of 51 Japanese banks.  Their ratings range 
from  B  (Shizuoka  Bank)  to  E  (10 banks  including  LTCB and  NCB). 
Moody's  assessment  differs  from the  Kin'yu Business ranking  in that it 
focuses  on solvency  and looks  at not only  obligations  of the parent but 
also  those  of  supported  subsidiaries.  Nonetheless,  the  Kin'yu Business 
ranking and Moody's  rating identify very similar sets of weak banks. For 
44. They rank ordinary banks  (city banks  and regional  banks)  and trust banks separately 
by looking  at size  (measured  by the average amount  of funds),  profitability (measured 
by business-profits-to-asset  ratio and interest margin), efficiency  (measured by expense 
ratio  and  interest  income  per  employee),  and  solvency  (measured  by  capital  ratio, 
nonperforming-loan  ratio,  provision  ratio  for  nonperforming  loans,  and  market-to- 
book  ratio  of  securities  holdings).  In  order  to  combine  two  separate  rankings,  we 
reranked city banks,  trust banks, and a long-term credit bank (Industrial Bank of Japan) 
using  eight of the nine indicators used by Kin'yu Business. The last indicator (market-to- 
book ratio of securities holdings)  was not easily  available. We established  the rankings 
of trust banks and IBJ  in the list of ordinary banks by comparing  them with  city banks 
included  in  the  list.  For example,  we  rank Sumitomo  Trust after DKB (ranked  12 in 
Kin'yu Business) and before  Fuji (ranked 28), since  Sumitomo  Trust is located  more or 
less  between  DKB and Fuji according  to the  indicators  we  are looking  at. Finally, we 
added  the  two  banks  that were  nationalized  in late  1998, Long-Term Credit Bank of 
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example,  10 of the 45 lowest-ranked  banks in Kin'yu Business are rated by 
Moody's,  and  of those  8 have  the lowest  rating (E) and the other 2 are 
the next lowest  rating (E+),  Among  Kin'yu Business's 69 worst banks,  15 
are rated by Moody's,  and  of those  9 have  E and the other  6 have  E+. 
Thus,  the  weakest  banks  in  the  Kin'yu Business ranking  are also  rated 
very low by Moody's. 
Given this overlap,  it is therefore not surprising  that if we base our exit 
forecasts  on  the  Moody's  data we  get  a very  similar picture.  If we  as- 
sume  that 10 banks with  E ratings will disappear,  their cumulative  loans 
amount  to 11.5% of total loans  in the banking  sector. Three of 15 banks 
(Daiwa,  Chuo  Trust, and Mitsui  Trust) that have  received  capital injec- 
tions  are included  in this group.  If all the banks  with  E ratings and E+ 
ratings were  to exit, their cumulative  loans would  be 49% of total loans, 
suggesting  a  much  bigger  contraction  than  we  expect.  However,  in- 
cluded  in the set of E and E+  banks are 13 of the 15 banks that received 
government  money,  so  it still seems  like  a nontrivial  fraction of these 
banks may be redundant. 
How  long  will  it take for such  a shift  in the Japanese banking  to be 
completed?  The  speed  of  adjustment  will  primarily  depend  on  three 
factors: how  fast  corporations  adjust  their  financing,  how  fast  house- 
holds  shift  their funds  out of bank deposits,  and how  fast the banking 
industry  is reorganized.  The previous  experience  suggests  that the  ad- 
justment  by  corporate borrowers  will  be  fairly quick.  Although  the  re- 
strictions  on corporate financing  options  were  only  gradually loosened, 
many  firms  adjusted  quickly  and most  completed  their adjustments  in 
less  than  10 years.  The  deregulation  of  the  remaining  restrictions  on 
corporate financing will be rapid. Thus, we expect the adjustment  on the 
corporate finance side to be complete  well within  10 years. 
How  fast  will  the  households  move?  Because  the  most  significant 
elements  of the  liberalization  of savers'  options  have  started only  very 
recently, this question  is much  harder to answer.  As we  saw  above,  the 
dependence  on deposits  by Japanese households  starts from such a high 
level  that even  a modest  change  towards  the patterns  observed  in other 
OECD economies  would  be sufficient to support our forecast. We believe 
that a modest  shift can take place in ten years, but there is a considerable 
amount  of uncertainty  in this conjecture. 
Finally, the  shrinkage  of bank  loans  will  imply  a substantial  exit  in 
the banking  industry  unless  Japanese banks shift away  from traditional 
banking  business  very  aggressively.  The speed  of such a reorganization 
obviously  depends  on  the  government's  policy  stance  toward  bank 
failures.  As  we  saw  in  Section  4,  the  Japanese  government  seems  fi- 
nally  to  have  begun  addressing  the  bad-loan  problem.  The  next  step The  Japanese  Banking Crisis * 199 
will  require  more  closures  of  insolvent  banks.  If  the  current  tough 
stance  of  the  FSA  and  the  FRC continues,  the  days  of  the  convoy 
system  of rescues  will be over. 
Nevertheless,  once  the  restructuring  begins  in  earnest,  we  imagine 
that it will take several years for the doomed  banks to exit. Importantly, 
the mergers  among  the largest banks in the fall of 1999 are not the kind 
of restructuring  we  have  in mind,  unless  contrary to the initial descrip- 
tions of these alliances,  they facilitate reductions in assets that would  not 
otherwise  be possible.  Combinations  of organizations  that do  not pro- 
mote  downsizing  are likely  to be counterproductive.  A particularly sa- 
lient  benchmark  is  Hokkaido  Takushoku  which,  although  it has  been 
dead  for more than two years,  still has most  of its assets  in the banking 
system.  Our  forecasts  require  that  the  assets  of  a failed  institution  be 
disposed  of, not  merely  moved  into  other banks.  The Hokkaido  Taku- 
shoku  experience  suggests  that the reorganization  could  take years,  al- 
though  we  see no reason to expect it to take more than a decade.  Thus, 
overall,  we  expect  the  transition  to  the  new  steady  state  to  be  fairly 
complete  by the end of the next decade. 
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Comment 
MICHAEL  HUTCHISON 
University  of California  at Santa  Cruz 
Takeo Hoshi  and Anil Kashyap have given  an insightful  and comprehen- 
sive  account  of the Japanese banking  problem,  and offer us a picture of 
an industry  likely to be in continuous  turmoil over the next decade  or so 
as banking is downsized  in favor of open  financial markets. The authors 
make  several  important  points.  First, Japanese banks  are under  severe 
competitive  pressure,  mainly  due  to unbalanced  financial regulation  al- 
lowing  large  firms  to  go  to  open  markets  but  not  allowing  banks  to 
compete effectively.  Second,  the asset price bubble and subsequent  reces- 
sion  are neither  the only, nor perhaps  the primary, reasons  for banking 
distress  in Japan. Third, the  Big Bang in Japan will  eventually  lead the 
structure  of  Japanese  finance  to  converge  to  the  U.S.  norm.  Fourth, 
convergence  to  the  U.S.  norm  implies  that  the  demand  for  loans  by 
Japanese  firms  will  decline  dramatically  over  the  next  decade  or  so, 
indicating  a huge contraction  in the Japanese banking  sector. 
I agree  with  most  of  the  points  made  in  the  paper  and  believe  the 
authors do an admirable job in supporting  their arguments.  It should  be 
a key  reference  work  for everyone  interested  in Japanese banking  and 
finance.  In my comments,  I focus on two points:  (1) the role of the asset 
price collapse  and subsequent  recession  in explaining  the banking prob- 
lem in Japan, and (2) the extent to which  bank-loan  demand  determines 
the size of the banking  sector. 
1. Banking  Problems:  Long-Run  Decline  in 
Competitiveness  or  Asset  Price  Collapse  and  Recession? 
The  question  of what  caused  the  banking  problem  is reviewed  in  the 
paper.  An  important  part  of  the  story  is  that banks  have  been  under 
severe  competitive  pressure  and have  changed  their principal business 
operations  due to shifts in the flows  of funds  and unbalanced  deregula- 
tion of the financial services  industry.  The response  of borrowers  is that 
large firms, but not small firms, have reduced  their dependence  on bank 
lending,  at least up to 1990 (before the Big Bang). Savers in Japan, on the 
other  hand,  continue  to  be  highly  dependent  on  bank  deposits  as  a 
major investment  vehicle.  Why have  they  stayed  in low-interest  depos- 
its? The authors argue that the poor service of investment  trusts and the 
slow  introduction  of new  products  are the major reasons.  The upshot  is 
that banks at present  continue  to have  a large deposit  base but have lost Comment 203 
their  primary  function  in  financing  large  firms'  investment  projects. 
How  have  they  utilized  the funds?  By pursuing  other forms of lending 
outside  their  traditional  customer  base,  such  as  real estate,  private  fi- 
nance,  and other relatively  high-risk lending  activities. 
A major point  of the paper is that long-run  competitive  pressure  is an 
important  factor  in  the  decline  in  the  return  on  assets  (ROA) in  the 
banking  sector  and  in  large  part responsible  for  the  banking  crisis  in 
Japan. The authors'  view  is that the present  crisis and consolidation  in 
the  industry  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  a longer-term  trend  to- 
wards contraction in the industry. Another explanation,  perhaps comple- 
mentary,  would  be  that macroeconomic  developments  (viz.,  a lengthy 
and deep  recession)  and idiosyncratic  temporary  factors (viz.,  the asset 
price collapse) are primarily responsible  for the banking crisis in Japan in 
the  1990s.  The  empirical  section  of  the  paper  is  important  in  that  it 
provides  evidence  for the authors' contention  that low ROA in the bank- 
ing  sector  has  a significant  long-run  trend component,  and  is likely to 
result in a large-scale  contraction of the banking  sector. 
The authors present  time-series  evidence  on this point.  They estimate 
an equation with macroeconomic  variables prior to the period of deregu- 
lation  (1983 is the date the authors  argue that deregulation  of the bond 
market began in earnest) to see what helps  explain the secular decline in 
the  accounting  rates  of  return.  Data  on  the  accounting  rate  of  return 
(after-tax net  income  divided  by  total assets)  reported  by the  firms are 
employed  after adjusting for the sales (gains and losses)  or revaluation  of 
securities.  Banks have  generally  tried to smooth  their reported  returns, 
however,  using  flexible accounting  practices to push  returns higher dur- 
ing  bad  times  and  lower  in good  times.  Since  bad  times  (good  times) 
generally  correspond  with  regressions  (upturns),  it is perhaps  not  sur- 
prising  that cyclical fluctuations  in the macroeconomic  variables  do not 
generally  enter the regressions  significantly.  The smoothing  of the ROA 
data can't hide  the  secular trend decline,  however,  and perhaps  this is 
why  the most significant  explanatory  variables in the regressions  are the 
time trend and the lagged  dependent  variable. 
The cross-section  evidence  is stronger.  The idea is to see if banks that 
were more dependent  on large firms or interest income before  deregulation 
would be particularly hard hit, in terms of lower ROAs, during the period 
following  deregulation.  The maintained  hypotheses  are that banks  (1) 
that lend  to large firms (firms that were  more able to take advantage  of 
deregulation  and  find  alternative  forms  of financing  in domestic  bond 
markets abroad), or (2) that are more concentrated  in traditional lending 
operations (that would  come under increasing competition  with deregula- 
tion) would  show  particularly large declines  in ROAs. The authors  find 204 *  HUTCHISON 
fairly strong  evidence  of this effect  on the decline  in ROA in the  1990s, 
supporting  their  argument  that the  loss  of traditional  markets  was  an 
important contributing  factor to the banking crisis. 
2.  Size  of the  Banking  Contraction 
Even accepting  that deregulation  and other forces are exerting long-term 
competitive  pressures  on banks,  essentially  forcing  a contraction  in the 
entire industry, the eventual  steady-state  size of the industry is still uncer- 
tain.  The  authors  attempt  to  quantify  the  projected  contraction  of  the 
Japanese banking  sector by using  the U.S.  case as a benchmark  model. 
The basic idea is that a falloff in loan demand by Japanese firms, bringing 
them  more  in line with  firms in the U.S.,  will reduce  the size  of banks. 
Banking  customers  are anticipated  to leave  banks  in favor  of direct fi- 
nance,  with the decline in loan demand  driving a reduction in the size of 
the banking  sector.  Making  a number  of simplifying  assumptions,  and 
given  the constraints imposed  by limited U.S.  data, the authors consider 
several alternative scenarios about how  large the reduction in bank loans 
might be over the medium  term, as the Big Bang facilitates the development 
of more open and deeper financial markets. All of these scenarios indicate 
a large reduction in loan demand and contraction in the Japanese banking 
sector ranging from about 30% to over 50%. 
These  medium-term  projections  seem  plausible,  but there are a num- 
ber of uncertainties  and caveats surrounding  the scenarios.  The paper is 
really about declining  loan demand  and not about the size  of the bank- 
ing sector.  There is an implicit assumption  that Japanese banks will not 
be  nimble  enough  to  reinvent  themselves  in  new  lines  of business- 
even,  the authors argue, if they are able to keep the high share of depos- 
its that they currently enjoy. This seems  to be borne out by recent experi- 
ence indicating  that Japanese financial institutions  continue  to dominate 
the low-margin  traditional areas such  as retail banking,  corporate lend- 
ing, and straight corporate bond issuance.  Foreign firms, by contrast, are 
rapidly  growing  in asset  management  and other areas that have  higher 
margins. 
The authors conjecture,  however,  that the Japanese banks that end up 
being  sold  to foreign  financial  institutions  (with  more expertise  in new 
financial  services  and  more  capital)  may  be  able to effectively  pick  up 
new  lines  of business  while  they  shed  loans.  The issue  appears  to boil 
down  to who  owns  the banks  and,  if the controlling  interests  are Japa- 
nese,  whether  they  can marshal the capital and expertise  to compete  in 
new  financial  services.  The  decline  in  traditional  banking  business- 
where low margins have contributed to the current bank problem-need Comment  *  205 
not  signal  the  end  of  the  prominent  position  of  banks  in  Japan or a 
contraction  of the banking  industry.  And the powers  that banks have to 
enter  investment  banking,  securities  business,  and  insurance  will  be 
virtually complete  by the year 2001. There is already a scramble in Japan 
to form new  alliances  and tie-ups  to take advantage  of these  opportuni- 
ties.  The authors document  over 60 tie-ups  and mergers in the Japanese 
financial  services  industry  announced  in  1998 and  early  1999.  Banks, 
flush  with  funds  from their huge  deposit  base,  would  seemingly  have 
some  advantage  in entering  these  new  markets.  The prospect  of a form 
of universal  banking  along Swiss  and German lines may be real. 
The 1980s was  a dynamic period for Japanese banks,  especially  on the 
international  front. Japanese banks grew rapidly, eventually  topping  the 
list of the  world's  largest banks,  and  Tokyo because  a leading  interna- 
tional financial center. The 1990s has been  a decade  of contraction,  con- 
solidation,  and pessimism  for the  industry.  The Big Bang has  changed 
the playing  field for Japanese finance  in the new  millennium,  however, 
and some Japanese banks appear to be in a good  position  to take advan- 
tage  of new  opportunities.  A 30-50%  decline  in loan demand  need  not 
translate  into  an  equally  gloomy  projection  of banking-sector  decline, 
but clearly signals  a new  form of banking in Japan. 
Comment 
MARK  GERTLER 
New  York University  and NBER 
This paper provides  a thoughtful  and exhaustive  analysis  of the banking 
problems  that have plagued  the Japanese economy  over the last decade. 
It is a useful  reference for anyone  interested  in the issue. 
Two basic premises  motivate  the analysis. 
The first is that the weak  financial  health  of the banking  system  is a 
central factor underlying  the prolonged  stagnation  of the Japanese econ- 
omy.  Over  the past  decade,  heavy  loan  losses  have  seriously  depleted 
the capital base of Japanese banks.  Loan losses  have  amounted  to about 
7% of  GDP, as  compared  to  the  roughly  2% experienced  during  the 
banking  crisis  in  the  United  States.  This  extraordinary  contraction  of 
bank capital, in turn, has impeded  the ability of banks to lend: Adequate 
capital  helps  banks  both  to  guarantee  their  uninsured  liabilities  (thus 
allowing  them  to  attract loanable  funds)  and  also  to  meet  regulatory 
minimum  requirements  on  the  ratio  of  capital  to  assets.  If capital  is 
insufficient,  bank  lending  may  be  constrained.  Bernanke  and  Lown 
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(1991) provide  evidence  that this kind of phenomenon  played  an impor- 
tant role in the  1990-1991  recession  in the United  States.  In the present 
context,  Woo  (1998) has  shown  that  depletion  of  bank  capital  was  a 
significant  factor in the 1997 recession  in Japan. 
The second  underlying  premise,  which  follows  from the first, is that 
recapitalization  of the banking system  is critical to the recovery in Japan. 
This problem of how to recapitalize is complex, however.  Due to informa- 
tional  problems  and  the  like,  it is  expensive  for banks  to  recapitalize 
simply  by  floating  new  equity  issues.  Retained  earnings  are the  usual 
method  by which  banks  rebuild  capital, but this can be a long,  drawn- 
out process.  Typically, in situations  like the one now  prevailing  in Japan, 
some  kind of public intervention  involving  taxpayer funds  is necessary. 
An  expectation  of public  bailouts,  however,  may  create adverse  incen- 
tives for excessive  risktaking. 
The absence of a straightforward solution  to the problem has prompted 
a heated  debate in the Japanese Diet over the path of recapitalization.  It is 
this debate that provides  the paper's explicit point of departure.  On the 
one  hand,  the  Liberal Democratic  Party (LDP) favors  directly  injecting 
public funds to prop up the existing system.  On the other, the Democratic 
Party favors  nationalizing  and  restructuring  the  system  in  a way  that 
would  likely  involve  a downsizing.  As  of  this  writing,  a compromise 
approach has been  adopted,  with  some  tilt toward the LDP position. 
The authors  observe  that the  debate  reflects fundamentally  differing 
views  of the  future of the Japanese banking  system.  They  interpret the 
LDP position  as reflecting  the belief  that the postcrisis  banking  system 
will look a lot like the precrisis one,  implying  the need  for large capital 
replenishment.  The Democrats,  they  argue,  envision  a smaller system, 
implying  less need  for public injections of bank capital. Given this inter- 
pretation  of the debate,  the authors  focus  their analysis  on providing  a 
rough  estimate  of  the  future  scale  of the  Japanese banking  system,  in 
order to get a sense  of what the future capital needs  may really be. 
I agree  that  the  kind  of  exercise  the  authors  perform  is  central  to 
resolving  the issue.  There is, however,  another important  dimension  to 
the  debate:  namely,  differing  views  on  the  incentive  effects  of  public 
subsidies.  At issue is not only how  much capital is needed,  but also what 
is the best mechanism  by which  to undertake the recapitalization.  In this 
vein,  I interpret the LDP position  as being  that injections of public funds 
will relax capital constraints  and thereby stimulate bank credit extension 
and economic  activity, with minimal bad side effects on risktaking incen- 
tives.  On the other hand,  the Democratic  Party perceives  the incentives 
for excessive  risktaking as being  a first-order problem,  with the channel- 
ing  of funds  into  risky, negative-present-value  projects being  the  likely Comment 207 
outcome  of  a bailout.  In particular, in  the  Democratic  view,  for banks 
well below  minimum  capital standards,  incremental  injections  of public 
funds  are not  likely  to deter  excessive  risktaking,  especially  in the  ab- 
sence of fundamental  reforms of the supervision  and regulatory system. 
Though  it is  not  the  focus  of  the  paper's  analysis,  the  issue  of  the 
incentive  effects of the restructuring is central to the question at hand and 
at least as important as the matter of how much capital is needed.  For both 
questions,  the U.S.  experience  with banking  problems  is instructive. 
The  first question  is: why  such  a mess?  The answer:  as before,  but 
worse.  As in the case of the United States, we can trace the beginning  of 
the  story  in Japan to a major deregulation  of financial  markets that oc- 
curred in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To be clear, the problems did not 
simply  evolve  from  deregulation,  which  in  principle  is  a good  thing. 
Rather,  they  evolved  from  the  failure  of  the  authorities  to  adjust  the 
supervision  and regulatory  system  adequately  in light of the new  envi- 
ronment.  In particular, the opening  up of capital markets and the emer- 
gence  of  nonbank  intermediaries  afforded  by  the  deregulation  led  to 
greatly increased  competition  for commercial  banks.  Banks, as a conse- 
quence,  lost  high-quality  borrowers.  They  responded  by  moving  into 
riskier ventures,  such  as  commercial  real estate  finance.  The problem 
was  that  the  implicit  lender-of-last-resort  protection  of  banking  re- 
mained  unaltered.  As with  the United States, this unadjusted  protection 
served to encourage excessive  risktaking in the face of increased competi- 
tive pressures. 
But why  was the Japanese debacle so much worse  than what occurred 
in  the  United  States?  Here  the  authors  provide  a convincing  answer: 
relative to the United States, capital markets before deregulation  in Japan 
were  far more heavily  distorted  in favor of banks.  The authors  make  a 
convincing  case that the powerful  Japanese megabanks  were the product 
less of greater efficiency  than of basic regulatory distortions,  in regard to 
both  the  financial  instruments  available  to  savers  and  the  sources  of 
funds  available  to borrowers.  Everything  else  equal,  accordingly,  it is 
only  natural that deregulation  brought  more additional  competition  for 
Japanese banks than for their U.S.  counterparts. 
Another  important  factor, I believe,  involved  regulatory  forbearance, 
i.e.,  lax supervision.  Here  the  problem  was  very  much  like  the  U.S. 
savings-and-loan  crisis, where failure to enforce capital requirements led 
to sustained  high-stakes  gambling  by zombie-like  financial  institutions. 
The  scale  of  this  type  of  behavior  was  simply  much  larger in  Japan. 
Why? First, it is likely that the strong performance  of the Japanese econ- 
omy until the early 1990s masked  the heavy  underlying  risk exposure  in 
the banking  system.  The United  States had the (perverse)  luxury of the 208 *  GERTLER 
S&L crisis to provide  a wake-up  call to regulators in the mid-1980s,  who 
as a consequence  were better positioned  to address the subsequent  prob- 
lems  in  commercial  banking.  In Japan,  in  contrast,  everything  hit  at 
once,  beginning  in 1993. The failure to anticipate the crisis,  in conjunc- 
tion with a weak overall system  of supervision  and regulation,  is thus an 
important  aspect of the crisis. 
What role did macroeconomic  factors play? I agree with the interpreta- 
tion  that  the  authors  give  in  the  revised  version  of  the  paper:  Poorly 
planned  deregulation  raised  the  exposure  of  the  banking  system  to 
macroeconomic  shocks,  such  as the decline  in asset prices and the over- 
all poor performance  of the economy.  Further, given  that Japanese banks 
hold  equity  directly, it is hard to believe  that the stock-market crash did 
not  have  an important  impact  on bank  capital.  In this vein,  I am con- 
cerned  that  the  authors'  inability  to  find  a significant  role  for macro- 
economic  factors  in  recent  years  may  reflect  measurement  problems. 
Their measure  of bank  profitability,  return on  assets,  is an accounting 
concept  rather than  a market-based  one.  But in  the  current  draft  the 
authors offer a careful qualification  of their findings. 
What will happen  in the future? To what level will the Japanese bank- 
ing  system  converge?  Here  the  authors  undertake  what  I regard as an 
eminently  sensible  exercise.  They  begin  with  the  premise  that,  given 
that the legal regulatory  structures in the two countries  are now  reason- 
ably similar, the banks in Japan should  converge  to the point where  they 
are providing  roughly  the same fraction of overall firm financing  as their 
counterparts  in the United  States.  Given  this benchmark,  they  proceed 
with  a calibration  exercise  to  compute  the  future  equilibrium  level  of 
bank assets  in Japan. They forecast a decline  of something  between  20% 
and 50% in the size  of the Japanese banking  system,  depending  on the 
scenario. 
In the  spirit  of  calibration,  no  standard  errors are to be  found.  But 
overall,  I find  the  forecast  to be  reasonable.  The only  quibble  I would 
have  is  that  the  authors  only  consider  directly  held,  i.e.,  on-balance- 
sheet,  assets.  In the United  States,  commercial banks have gone  heavily 
into off-balance-sheet  activities, which  include  providing  backup lines of 
credit,  derivatives  trading,  and so on.  These  off-balance-sheet  activities 
entail risk, and banks  are required to hold  capital in proportion  to their 
credit  equivalents  (i.e.,  the  measure  of  on-balance-sheet  assets  that 
would  entail  equivalent  risk; see  Boyd  and  Gertler,  1994).  Thus,  any 
attempt  to measure  bank capital needs,  in my view,  should  include  off- 
balance-sheet  activity as well  as traditional on-balance-sheet  assets. 
Again,  the U.S.  example  is instructive.  Measures based  simply  on on- 
balance-sheet  assets  suggest  that  U.S.  commercial  banks  are  steadily Discussion 209 
declining  in relative  importance.  I show  in my  work  with  John Boyd, 
however,  that after allowing  for off-balance-sheet  activities,  the reverse 
is  in  fact true: U.S.  commercial  banks  have  actually  grown  in  relative 
importance.  It is true that Japanese banks have  been  slow  to move  into 
these nontraditional  lines of business.  However,  if the Japanese financial 
system  evolves  toward  the  U.S.  system,  as  assumed  here,  then  we 
should  similarly expect to see a rise in off-balance-sheet  business.  Firms 
that  issue  open-market  debt  in  the  United  States,  for example,  often 
secure  this  debt  by  obtaining  backup  lines  of  credit  from  commercial 
banks.  We should  also expect a similar reliance on backup credit lines  at 
banks  to  support  direct  financing  in  Japan.  I am  not  suggesting  that 
allowing  for nontraditional  bank activities  will  reverse  the  authors'  re- 
sults,  but I do think that it is important  to do so in any debate over the 
future size  of Japanese banking. 
I conclude  with one final message  from the U.S. experience.  The recov- 
ery of the U.S. banking  system  involved  not only replenishment  of capi- 
tal, but also the adoption of a tougher supervision  and regulatory system. 
In addition,  macroeconomic  policy,  and  monetary  policy  in particular, 
helped provide  a stable climate for banks to operate. For Japan to succeed, 
it must follow  the United  States in these  two important dimensions. 
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Discussion 
In his reply to the discussants,  Anil Kashyap agreed that macroeconomic 
factors had  probably  played  some  role  in the  Japanese banking  crisis. 
The authors'  intention  had  not been  to deny  the role of macro factors, 
but  to highlight  the  part played  by  deregulation,  as well  as the  likely 
convergence  of Japanese  banking  to  U.S.  norms.  He  noted  that  there 
was  no  fundamental  disagreement  between  the  authors  and  the  dis- 
cussants  about the forecast of a large contraction in the Japanese banking 
sector. Kashyap  conceded  that it is possible,  as Mark Gertler suggested, 
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that expansion  of off-balance-sheet  activities  might  mitigate  the shrink- 
age,  but he also pointed  out data in the paper showing  that fee income 
relative  to total income  for Japanese banks is the same  now  as it was  in 
1979, implying  little growth  in such  activities.  The policy  implication  of 
their work, Kashyap  said, was that funds  should  not be injected into the 
banking  system  indiscriminately,  since  many banks  are unlikely  to sur- 
vive  in any case. 
Michael  Mussa  said  that  prior  to  1995 no  bank  among  the  largest 
twenty banks in Japan had reported an annual loss and that, more gener- 
ally, the short-run accounting  numbers  are not to be believed.  This poses 
obvious  econometric  difficulties  when  one  tries to estimate  the sensitiv- 
ity of the rate of return on bank assets  to macroeconomic  disturbances; 
one will find coefficients  that are much  too low. Mussa also commented 
that one of the key issues  is who  will ultimately  be stuck with the bill for 
the losses  that are on the balance  sheets  of the banks  now.  If taxpayers 
foot the bill, banks will be more able to expand into other businesses,  but 
if the banking  industry  as a whole  bears much of the cost, their competi- 
tive  disadvantage  will  be  increased.  Mussa  concluded  that if the Japa- 
nese  banks  are handed  the  bill,  the  authors'  estimates  of the  ultimate 
size  of Japanese banking  system  may turn out to be too high. 
Hoshi  responded  to Mussa's  comment  by saying  that transactions  in 
"hidden assets" are the most popular  method  used by Japanese banks to 
smooth  out  returns.  Banks  sell  these  securities  in  the  market,  realize 
accounting  capital  gains,  and  then  buy  back  the  securities  at  market 
prices. Hoshi  said that the authors plan to subtract capital gains from the 
current income  of the  banks  to obtain  what  might  be  a more  accurate 
measure  of  profits  from  operations.  On  Mussa's  second  point,  Hoshi 
thought  that Japan has been  moving  toward increasing  the contribution 
of taxpayers  and reducing  that of banks. 
John Fernald  asked  whether  financial  and  banking  reforms  were  of 
great  consequence  in  Japan. The  usual  argument  is  that  the  financial 
system's  health affects the allocation of capital, but Fernald cited Michael 
Gibson's  work  which  emphasizes  the  importance  of  corporate  gover- 
nance.  Gibson has argued  that many  features  of the Japanese corporate 
governance  system  insulate  managers  from  shareholder  pressure  to  a 
much  greater  extent  than  in  the  United  States.  Absent  reform  in  this 
dimension,  banking  reform may  not  improve  the  allocation  of capital. 
Moreover,  if Japanese  corporate  governance  differs  radically  from  the 
U.S.  case,  the argument  for convergence  of the two banking  systems  is 
less  compelling.  Fernald  also  raised  the  issue  of  how  exactly  the 
downsizing  will occur: he  felt that layoffs,  shutdowns,  and attempts  to 
diversify  into new  businesses  would  all prove difficult. Discussion  211 
Nouriel  Roubini commented  that the banking crisis in Japan resembles 
the banking  crises in the rest of Asia. In particular, in both cases deregu- 
lation,  liberalization  of the capital account,  poor regulatory supervision, 
and poorly  designed  deposit  insurance  on  the banking  side,  as well  as 
poor  corporate  governance,  led  to excessively  risky lending  to the  real 
estate  and  manufacturing  sectors.  As  the  number  of  nonperforming 
loans  grew,  policymakers  compounded  their errors by  turning  a blind 
eye,  leading  to further risktaking on the part of both lenders and borrow- 
ers. In short, Roubini agreed with Fernald that banking-system  reform is 
only  half of the  story; the other half is reform of corporate  governance 
and corporate restructuring.  Hoshi  agreed  that there are similarities be- 
tween Japan and other East Asian cases. A difference,  however,  is that in 
Thailand and Korea bad loans made  as part of cozy bank-firm  relation- 
ships  were  partly responsible  for the  crisis, whereas  in Japan the issue 
was  not  relationship  banking  but  rather its  collapse,  which  happened 
before  the  crisis.  He  argued  that  corporate  governance  (as it evolved 
under  the  keiretsu  and  main bank  systems)  might  have  been  better  in 
Japan before  deregulation,  so  that deregulation  worsened  governance. 
Martin Feldstein  suggested  that,  while  U.S.  banks  began  to take up 
liability  management  when  they  understood  that  their  good  lending 
opportunities  were  shrinking,  the  Japanese  banks  didn't  worry  about 
such issues  because  of their confidence  that the government  would  pro- 
tect them.  In short,  the market had not been  allowed  to work in Japan. 
Feldstein  asked  why  the Japanese  government  had  deregulated  in the 
first place  and  whether  U.S.  influence  was  important.  Kashyap  down- 
played  possible  U.S.  influence  on the decision  to deregulate,  emphasiz- 
ing instead  the  1974 recession  that led the Japanese government  to run 
big deficits.  To place the resulting  bonds  the government  had to liberal- 
ize  the  bond  market,  and  once  that had  been  done,  political  pressure 
increased  to  liberalize  other  financial  markets  as  well.  Feldstein  re- 
sponded  that  in  the  early  1980s there  had  been  attempts  by  the  U.S. 
government  to get  the Japanese to Americanize  their financial  system, 
because  some  U.S.  officials apparently  thought  that this would  help  to 
improve  the bilateral trade balance. 
Rick Mishkin suggested  that not only deregulation  but also changes  in 
information  technology  have  made  it easier to use nonbank finance.  He 
also cited the need for more sophisticated  supervision  with,  in particular, 
an emphasis  on  overall risk management  rather than  on  the  quality of 
individual  loans  or the level  of accounting  capital. Similar problems  are 
likely  to be encountered  in Europe  to those  in Japan, Mishkin  said,  as 
changing markets and deregulation  proceed but supervision  doesn't keep 
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was formed in Japan, many people,  including  him, were pessimistic:  The 
FSA had  only  400 bank supervisors  for all of Japan, and they  were  the 
same people  who,  as employees  of the Ministry of Finance, had presided 
over the whole  debacle in the first place. To Kashyap's surprise, however, 
the new  FSA turned out to be vigilant,  tough,  and sophisticated.  Michael 
Hutchison  interjected that perhaps it should not be a surprise that institu- 
tional changes  matter; in particular, having a separate FSA directly under 
the prime minister and with political support is a very different situation 
from what  existed  before.  Hutchison  added  that after all the praise that 
had been heaped  on the "Asian model," supposedly  characterized by the 
close and willing  cooperation  of banks, government,  and corporations,  it 
was interesting  to see how  quickly many participants had left the system 
when  the opportunity  presented  itself. 
Ben Bernanke asked  a question  about the flow  of funds.  If the savers 
are still putting  their money  into deposits  but suddenly  the firms can go 
to the capital markets, where  are the funds  in the capital markets coming 
from? He  suggested  that retained  earnings  might  be a major source  of 
corporate financing,  which  if true suggests  that the source of the decline 
in loan demand  is not deregulation  so much as a corporate sector that is 
increasingly  self-financed.  Julio Rotemberg  added  that,  in  light  of  Ja- 
pan's  large  current-account  surplus,  somebody  has  to  be  acquiring 
claims  on  foreigners;  perhaps  this  is being  done  through  banks.  Feld- 
stein  said that banks  and insurance  companies  are large net purchasers 
of dollar-denominated  bonds. 
Bernanke  said that, based  on earlier work by the authors with  David 
Scharfstein,  he  had  the  impression  that  close  bank-firm  relationships 
were beneficial  in that they reduced  information  and incentive  problems 
in  lending.  Yet when  deregulation  occurred,  the  big  firms  abandoned 
their bank relationships  as quickly as they could.  Why did that happen? 
Kashyap  answered  that the main bank system  and the attendant  regula- 
tion had benefits  but also costs,  such  as reduced  flexibility of financing 
options.  Hoshi  added  that  the  benefits  of  relationship  banking  were 
relatively  larger  for  small  firms,  so  that  when  deregulation  occurred 
large firms had the stronger incentive  to leave  their relationships. 
Stephen  Zeldes  pointed  out  a  common  theme  in  this  paper  and 
Heaton  and Lucas's paper  in this volume,  which  is increased  participa- 
tion of consumers  in financial markets.  For example,  as Japanese savers 
begin  to hold  diversified  stock portfolios,  perhaps  Japanese stock prices 
will  rise,  as  Heaton  and  Lucas  argue  happened  in  the  United  States. 
Higher  stock  prices  would  have  the  side  benefit  of helping  the banks. 
Kashyap acknowledged  the possibility,  but reiterated the point that liber- 
alization for savers has proceeded  relatively  slowly  in Japan. 